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I. INTRODUCTION
The international community is still in the early stages of integrating
a human rights regime into development finance to protect individuals
and communities. This Article focuses on the progressive engagement
of international financial institutions (IFIs)1with human rights law and
policies, which is filling the endemic binary gap between investment
prerogatives and social and environmental concerns. It conceptualizes
and categorizes the field of development finance and human rights
while simultaneously paving the way forward by providing guidelines
for all relevant stakeholders.
The rapid evolution of multilateralism – particularly with regard to
IFIs – generated a legal and governance gap in human rights
protection. This is a fundamental challenge facing the 2030
sustainable development agenda,2 given IFIs’ dual goal of ending
extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity.3 On the occasion of
the launch of the new U.N. agenda at the seventieth session of the U.N.
General Assembly in New York in 2015, Pope Francis directly
appealed to international financial agencies to undertake a deeper
engagement with sustainable development in order to topple poverty,
1. See generally Daniel D. Bradlow, International Law and the Operations of
the International Financial Institutions, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 1–3 (Daniel D. Bradlow & David B.
Hunter eds., Kluwer Press, 2010) (defining IFIs through the listing of examples of
certain IFIs and discussing the ways in which the dual character of IFIs is relevant
to international law); Marc Uzan, The Process Towards the New International
Financial Architecture, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
408, 421–23 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., U.N. Univ. Press, 2001)
(stating the importance of the World Bank and the IMF and detailing how they, along
with other IFIs, influence policy in order to positively influence the world economy).
2. See G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development, at 1–4 (Oct. 21, 2015) (establishing the vision and goals
set by the United Nations in the 2030 sustainable development agenda).
3. See World Bank Group (WBG), Ending Poverty and Sharing Prosperity,
Global Monitoring Report 2014/2015, 35–36 (2015) (showing the dichotomy
formed between a focus on human rights and a focus on “ending extreme poverty
and promoting shared prosperity” by stating that especially in developing countries,
economic growth may best be fostered in part through increasing labor and
productivity).
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exclusion, and dependence around the world.4
Analyzing development finance through the lens of human rights
fosters an understanding of how IFIs have incorporated new goals and
targets in their mandate, progressively embracing a broader concept of
development up to and including the idea of sustainable and inclusive
development. The launch of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals5
in 2015 was a prelude to two major events in development finance that
shaped IFIs’ mandate in line with sustainability and inclusion. First,
the World Bank’s October 2018 operationalization of the
Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) within its policies set a
new environmental and social risks management strategy to improve
development outcomes, in line with other development institutions.6
Second, the 2019 decision of the US Supreme Court on immunities
and responsibilities of international organizations in Jam v.
International Finance Corp. potentially altered IFIs’ status under
international law and their exposure to liability before domestic
courts.7 Consistent with this path, notwithstanding their original
economic mandate, IFIs have adopted a silent agenda on human rights
that mirrors the global effort to move toward sustainability.
This Article uses lessons from the fields of business and human
rights policy development to examine the most salient aspects of
development finance under the lens of the “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” model.8The U.N. Business and Human Rights model sought
4. See Pope Francis, Holy See, Address at the U.N. General Assembly (Sept.
25, 2015) (“The International Financial Agencies are [sic] should care for the
sustainable development of countries and should ensure that they are not subjected
to oppressive lending systems which, far from promoting progress, subject people
to mechanisms which generate greater poverty, exclusion and dependence.”).
5. See G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 2, at 14 (listing the seventeen goals of the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development).
6. SeeWorld Bank Group, Environmental and Social Framework, 15–16 (Apr.
13, 2017) (giving an overview of the World Bank’s Environmental and Social
Framework and stating its objectives).
7. See Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759, 771–72 (2019) (holding that
international development banks do not hold absolute immunity from suit under
United States law, opening organizations like IFIs to suit depending on the activity
in which they are engaging).
8. See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General),
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31
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to address specific corporate issues in relation to their impact on
human rights.9 It constituted a framework for differentiated but
complementary responsibilities comprising three essential pillars:
first, the state’s duty to protect against human rights abuses by third
parties, which lies at the heart of international human rights law;
second, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, based on
international rules and social expectations of the business sector; and
third, the need for access to remedies (i.e., judicial redress for
abuses.)10 Business corporations, as economic subjects, have unique
responsibilities, especially in fragile contexts where the insufficiency
of domestic governance undermines human rights’ protection.11 The
three pillars together create a complementary framework in which
each supports the others in the endeavor of furthering sustainability.
Mutatis mutandis, applying the Protect, Respect and Remedymodel
to development finance, seeks to reduce adverse human rights
consequences of governance misalignments in developing contexts.12
Based on the business and human rights experience, it is possible to
use lessons from corporate social responsibility to create a conceptual
and policy framework common to all relevant stakeholders.13 The
(Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights]
(explaining the three pillars of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework: (1)
“the State duty to protect against human rights abuses”; (2) “the corporate
responsibility to respect human rights”; and (3) “the need for greater access by
victims to effective remedy”).
9. See id. at 3–4 (stating that the Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights were created after substantial research and investigation conducted into
human rights abuses by businesses, leading to the eventual creation of the “Protect,
Respect and Remedy” Framework).
10. Id.
11. See id. at 13 (commenting that a business’ obligation to respect human rights
exists independently of states’ human rights obligations and goes above a business’s
compliance with national law, intertwining a state’s obligations and choices whether
or not to comply with their obligations to human rights with a business’s
responsibility to do the same).
12. See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General),
Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, at 1,
6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Protect, Respect and Remedy]
(stating that the three pillars foster a supportive community between government,
business, and society which helps to align social policies of all three against the
governance gaps which allow for human rights abuses).
13. See R.R. Baxter, International Law in “Her Infinite Variety”, 29 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 549, 561–63 (1980) (suggesting that voluntary guidelines which leave
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model is intended to have cumulative effects on each of the three
pillars in order to more effectively combine business needs with
human rights prerogatives.14
The proposed methodology aims to shed light on a sphere of
international law that is still blurred by an undefined perimeter by
providing an assessment of social and environmental rights in
development finance, improving the theoretical framework, and
strengthening IFIs’ processes for its empirical success. IFIs can make
a unique contribution by providing a systemic response that addresses
governance gaps in multilateral cooperation at both the international
and domestic levels. Though they do not have a political mandate or
coercive powers, they do have – given their economic scope and the
decentralized nature of the international community – a key role in
leading the 2030 sustainable agenda and setting expectations and
aspirations while bringing together all relevant stakeholders.15 Not
only does this Article provide a unique perspective on the recent
developments state of the art in development finance and human
rights, it also strikes a balance between these two opposite but
conterminous fields in line with the U.N. sustainable development
agenda.
The remainder of the Article sets forth a multi-part analysis of how
room for legislation may create a framework that can apply to states, corporations,
and the international community at large, leading to the positive human rights
changes desired); LINDA SENDEN, SOFT LAW IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 212–
16 (2004) (stating that corporate codes of conduct relating to human rights may be
a starting point for firmer universal frameworks in the future); Gustaaf M. Borchardt
& Karel C. Wellens, Soft Law in European Community Law, 14 EUR. L. REV. 267,
309–12, 314–15 (1989) (detailing the ways in which soft law guidelines may pave
the way for frameworks of law, binding on all parties, which encourage the
development of human rights regulations); Tadeusz Gruchalla-Wesierski, A
Framework for Understanding “Soft Law”, 30 MCGILL L.J. 37, 85–86 (1984)
(introducing sanctions as a way in which international organizations may influence
states’ compliance with human rights obligations and codes of conduct).
14. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 8, at 13
(“These Guiding Principles . . . could serve as a useful basis for building a
cumulative positive effect that takes into account the respective roles and
responsibilities of all stakeholders.”).
15. See G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 2, ¶¶ 6–7, 11–13 (stating that the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development aims to create a new approach to sustainable
development while reaffirming previous conference outcomes to work towards its
ambitious goals).
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to achieve this balanced framework. Part I defines states’ duty to
protect, analyzing developing countries’ challenges and IFIs’
limitations in furthering a human rights agenda vis-à-vis states’
domestic jurisdiction and sovereign prerogatives. Part II describes
IFIs’ obligations under human rights law, tracing the evolution of the
rights-based approach to development to the new ESF of the World
Bank implemented in fall 2018. Part III identifies access to remedies
for human rights violations in IFI-financed projects, analyzing quasi-
judicial and judicial mechanisms available to affected people and the
effect of Jam v. International Finance Corp. The alignment of the
three pillars demonstrates that despite being economic institutions,
IFIs are furthering a silent human rights agenda as they pursue their
global challenge of ending poverty and promoting shared prosperity
through sustainable solutions.
II. STATES’ DUTY TO PROTECT
The first pillar of the Protect, Respect and Remedy model is states’
duty to protect human rights.16 Sovereign states are the entities
primarily subject to international law.17 However, some of them lack
the institutional capacity to build a sound framework for human rights
protection.18 Imbalances in domestic regulation are particularly
evident in the dichotomy between countries that are members of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
and those that are not; in the latter, domestic standards of legal
protection may align poorly with the international agenda.19 Indeed,
16. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 8, at 4.
17. See Andrea Bianchi, The Fight for Inclusion: Non-State Actors and
International Law, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA 39, 40–41 (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., Oxford
Univ. Press, 2011) (stating that while multiple types of entities have now become
recognized under the international legal regime, the regime primarily recognizes
states “as the bearers of rights and obligations”).
18. See Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 12, ¶ 14 (emphasizing that
developing countries may not have the resources to implement a human rights
regime and ensure its enforcement against transnational firms doing business in their
territory).
19. See WORLD BANK ORGANIZATION & ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO
DEVELOPMENT: DONORAPPROACHES, EXPERIENCES, ANDCHALLENGES 110–12 (2d
ed. 2013) (indicating that despite efforts which have been taken to aid states which
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especially in developing countries, where governance structures are in
the process of stabilizing, the rule of law tends to be weak and
corruption tends to be prevalent.20 An effective response should aim
to reduce this gap. From this perspective, states’ duty to protect is bi-
dimensional, involving both law and policy.21
This section focuses on every country’s duty to respect human
rights based on general principles of international law and human
rights agreements that have been domestically ratified. In the context
of development finance, borrowing countries often encounter systemic
problems in complying with their duty to protect.22 For this reason,
international organizations often serve as vehicles for furthering
human rights at the domestic level as they assist domestic institutions
with compliance mechanisms.23 Depending on the income level
defined in internal graduated policies, there are different levels of
support that IFIs can provide to each client.24 However, due to their
are not members of the OECD, it appears that the frameworks which may be
introduced are unable to be properly implemented, holding those countries back
from maintaining a sustainable human rights regime).
20. See Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 12, ¶ 16 (stating that as of 2006,
corporate human rights violations occurred at a disproportionately higher rate in
lower income countries, countries either in or coming out of conflict, and countries
where there is a weak rule of law).
21. See David M. Trubek et al., “Soft Law,” “Hard Law,” and European
Integration: Toward Theory of Hybridity, U.WIS. L. SCH. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER
SER., Nov. 2005, at 1–3 (recognizing that the regimes of “hard” and “soft” law may
work best together in order to reduce the gap in domestic standards of legal
protection between developed and developing countries); see also Kerstin
Jacobsson, Between Deliberation and Discipline: Soft Governance in EU
Employment Policy, in SOFT LAW AND GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS 81, 81, 85–88 (Ulrika Mörth ed., 2004) (introducing
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as a new form of soft law that focuses on
the political aspect of enforcement via cooperation, peer pressure, and peer
governance to spur development of social policies across nations in an ongoing
process).
22. See Ending Poverty and Sharing Prosperity, supra note 3, at 63, 67–68
(stating the vulnerability of low-income developing countries to economic shock
when they do not have a properly autonomous economy in place).
23. See, e.g., Integrating Human Rights into Development, supra note 19, at 111
(stating that DFID and UNDP have each participated in poverty reduction strategies
directly in Uganda).
24. See id. at 219–26 (explaining the ten principles IFIs should use when
working to support human rights in their client countries).
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economic mandate, IFIs, encumbered by a formalistic approach, have
often been prevented from interfering with domestic political affairs.25
A. INTERNATIONALMODELS FORDEVELOPING COUNTRIES
States have a general duty to protect people in their jurisdiction
against human rights abuses.26 Under the international law of treaties,
universal and regional human rights conventions require states,
through binding or nonbinding formulas, to take all necessary steps to
reach such a level of protection, including preventing, investigating,
and punishing abuse and providing access to redress.27
The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights define
states’ duty to protect as a “standard of conduct.”28 Under this
25. E.g., id. at 149–50 (stating that IFIs such as the World Bank, the African
Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Islamic
Development Bank, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) are required by
their founding documents not to interfere in their member countries’ politics).
26. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 8, at 6 (stating
that one of the Foundational Principles of the Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights is that states have an obligation to protect against human rights
abuses).
27. See Philip Alston, The “Not-a-Cat” Syndrome: Can the International
Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NON-STATE ACTORS
ANDHUMANRIGHTS 3, 20, 22–23 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (discussing international
personality and comparing the “moral” obligations of international organizations to
those of states when it comes to human rights perspectives); see also Larry Catá
Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The Multinational
Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global Governance Order, 18
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 775–76 (2011) (stating that although one of the
three pillars of the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework is that states have an
obligation to protect human rights, there are also obligations on non-state actors
required by the framework); Bianchi, supra note 17, at 54 (stating that a new
approach to corporate responsibility for human rights abuses is on the rise wherein
states would be responsible for holding their corporate entities accountable for such
abuses using their international authority as states); Anthony Clark Arend, Do Legal
Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 107,
129 (1998) (providing that states and the structure of international law are “mutually-
constitutive”: the states’ interactions create the structure of international law, which
goes on to shape the identities of the states that themselves influence the way states
act in the international theater).
28. See Justine Nolan, Refining the Rules of the Game: The Corporate
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, 30 UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 7, 7–8
(2014) (positing that states have long had the responsibility of protecting human
rights based upon international treaties and codes of conduct produced by the United
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definition, a state’s responsibility under human rights law is at stake
only whenever an international wrongful act is attributable to it. On
one hand, states should enact and deploy preventive and remedial
measures, including appropriate policies, legislation, regulations, and
adjudication. On the other hand, states should promote formal and
substantial understanding of the rule of law in order to further equality
before the law and apply it fairly through solid domestic governance
and institutions. This is the way to secure, in turn, accountability, legal
certainty, predictability, and transparency. Whenever a state fails to
take necessary measures to prevent, investigate, punish, and redress
abuses in its territory, it can be held internationally responsible.29
Operationalizing states’ duty to protect can be particularly difficult
in developing countries, where substantial procedural bottlenecks can
hinder domestic stability and local capacity.30 In order to address and
Nations such as the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights); David
Bilchitz, A Chasm Between “Is” and “Ought”? A Critique of the Normative
Foundations of the SRSG’s Framework and Guiding Principles, in HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO
RESPECT? 111–14 (David Bilchitz & Surya Deva eds., 2013) (arguing that if states
have the obligation to prevent human rights abuses within their territory, and that
obligation extends to the prevention of human rights abuses by third parties, then all
third parties are thereby inherently obligated to prevent human rights abuses); see
also Robert C. Blitt, Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Charting an Embracive Approach to Corporate Human Rights Compliance,
48 TEX. INT’L L. J. 33, 35, 42, 60 (2012) (advocating that the Guiding Principles do
not go far enough in merely providing that states have a duty to protect human rights,
and that while they are a good starting point for corporations to build forward from
in order to actually minimize human rights abuse, corporations should aim higher
with the aid of states).
29. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly
on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 49, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Pt. 2) (stating that conduct may be attributable to a
State if three conditions are met under Article 9 of the Draft Articles on
responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts).
30. See generally Amber Pariona, What is a Developing Country?,
WORLDATLAS (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-a-
developing-country.html (“The most widely accepted definition of a developing
country is one that has low levels of industrialization and fares poorly on the Human
Development Index (HDI). A low HDI score means that the citizens of a particular
country have lower life expectancy, lower educational attainment, lower per capita
incomes, and higher fertility rates than found in other countries”); Who are the
Developing Countries in the WTO?, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (last visited Apr. 25,
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support the economic, environmental, and social imbalances of
developing countries, the United Nations supports developmental
aid and cooperation through governments and specialized financial
institutions, such as IFIs.31
B. INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS’ SUPPORT TODEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
The role of international organizations (IOs) is critical in building
effective, durable solutions in the realms of security, growth, and
equity, which lie at the heart of sustainable development.32 First, IOs
play a major role in regime change at the domestic level.33 They
represent a channel of influence that connects the international sphere
with the national one.34 Second, they often serve an important role in
ensuring compliance.35
States’ ability to comply with international rules depends primarily
on the capacity of each actor with respect to its knowledge,
institutions, and financial resources.36 Since states are often unable to
2020) (stating that in the World Trade Organization, member states will identify
whether they are “developing” or “developed,” but their identification may be
challenged by other member states).
31. G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 2, ¶¶ 44–45, 55.
32. See generally, Tom M. Franck, Fairness to Persons: The Democratic
Entitlement, in FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 133, 136–39
(Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (discussing the principle of democratic entitlement and
the ways in which international organizations provide oversight and accountability
throughout the development process).
33. See id. (outlining how the standards of international system impact the
national governance).
34. See Ronald B. Mitchell, Compliance Theory: An Overview, in IMPROVING
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 7 (1996), reprinted in
DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 373,
373 (4th ed. 2011) (explaining that international bodies may engage with states in
negotiations regarding the treaty obligations with which the state may comply).
35. See Jacob Werksman & Kirk Herbertson, The Aftermath of Copenhagen:
Does International Law Have a Role to Play in a Global Response to Climate
Change?, 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 109 (2010), reprinted in DAVID HUNTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (4th ed. 2011) (detailing the
various ways in which international organizations provide support to states to ensure
compliance).
36. Mitchell, supra note 34, at 375.
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comply on their own, promotion of, and assistance with, compliance
is key in securing the effectiveness of the agreements they are part of.37
From a constructivist perspective, IOs play a crucial role in assisting
countries domestically and shaping their behavior in line with
international standards.38
IOs’ techniques for furthering compliance with international
agreements entail a cyclical process.39 They aim at raising awareness,
promoting and monitoring implementation, providing assistance, and
measuring and reporting performance.40 With IOs’ support,
compliance evolves through a “managerial” approach that seeks to
further improve states’ performances related to the underlying issue
covered by the constituency agreement or IOs’ further regulations.41
This mirrors a constructivist assumption that the social nature of the
international system is more effective than a sanctioning system, as it
allows internalization of international norms at the domestic level.
Likewise, constructivism holds that systems based on punitive
enforcement mechanisms are rarely available and workable.42
Therefore, through compliance, it is possible to provide member states
with a sound framework for observing their international obligations.43
37. See id. (calling for a “more cooperative approach to ensuring compliance”).
38. See Peter H. Sand, Institution-Building to Assist Compliance with
International Environmental Law: Perspectives, 56 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 774,
776–79 (1996) (mentioning various examples of treaty management); see also
Stanley Hoffmann, International Law and the Control of Force, in THERELEVANCE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO GROSS 21, 36–38 (Karl W.
Deutsch & Stanley Hoffman eds., 1968) (exploring methods by which international
organizations encourage states to see that treaty compliance is in their best interest).
39. Jacobsson, supra note 21, at 81.
40. SeeWerksman & Herbertson, supra note 35, at 109 (demonstrating how the
compliance mechanisms work in a Multilateral Environmental Agreement).
41. See Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory
Cooperation, 32 CASEW. RES. J. INT’LL. 387, 407–08 (2000) (finding a managerial
approach better furthers the goals of the agreement than a punitive enforcement
mechanism).
42. Within a constructivist frame of analysis, Thomas Franck’s theory of legal
legitimacy upholds that norms emanated through a fair process, which allocate
resources in an equitable fashion, through an equal law-making process, are key
drivers for ensuring compliance. See generally THOMASM. FRANCK, THE POWER FO
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).
43. See id. (explaining that the “social nature of the international system” allows
a compliance mechanism to work effectively).
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The managerial approach to compliance undertakes a cooperative
problem-solving approach tailored to eliminate or mitigate problems
related to the functional areas covered under the agreements of each
IO.44 This approach is grounded on three factors: (1) as treaties are
based on the consent of the contracting parties, thus embedding
national interests, states will likely respect them; (2) with the support
of organizational structures and procedures, it is possible to enhance
flexibility and political consensus; and (3) it furthers an efficiency-
based rationale for future compliance, as states will more likely
comply with the standards of the organizations they belong to.45 This
approach enhances a transparent system of knowledge and
information about the policy-related and normative progress of each
IO member state.46 The agreement defines the operational and
procedural aspects of a transparent information system.47 Adequacy,
accuracy, availability, and accessibility of information are key factors
for enhancing cooperation between all relevant actors with respect to
the topical areas covered by the organization, and transparency allows
for better coordination and synergies.48
Moreover, IOs monitor and report domestic situations in order to
secure states’ performance.49 In the field of international
environmental law, the OECD has developed an independent review
44. See id. (articulating that such an approach encourages compliance).
45. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 4–
5, 7 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995) (finding that states are more likely to comply with
treaty obligations when authoritative rules and regulations govern compliance
procedure).
46. See id. at 126 (noting that such a system allows for elaboration of treaty
norms).
47. See id. at 125 (describing international organizations as “creature[s] of law,”
and explaining that their various functions and limitations are identified in treaties).
48. See Daniel D. Bradlow & David B. Hunter, Conclusion: The Future of
International Law and International Financial Institutions, in INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 389, 392 (Daniel D. Bradlow
&David B. Hunter eds., 2010) (noting organizational involvement allows for greater
transparency and communication with regard to international legal obligations). See
generally id. at 22–24.
49. See Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist
Theory, 20 INT’L SEC. 39, 45–46 (1995) (explaining that international organizations
provide certain functions which serve, in part, to make up for the lack of a central
enforcement mechanism).
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mechanism to monitor the implementation of international
environmental agreements in its member states.50 It entails monitoring
followed by reports and recommendations for each country.51
Similarly, regional trade agreements include monitoring
mechanisms.52 For example, the North American Free Trade
Agreement created a trilateral mechanism, integrated by
representatives of each member state, which investigates trade-related
environmental matters.53
The International Labour Organization provides a Committee of
Experts that works closely with member states, reviewing and
reporting findings and ultimately improving their performance.54
Similarly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has mechanisms for
cooperating closely with domestic governments and reviewing their
economic performance.55 Moreover, the OECD and the World Trade
Organization promote systematic reviews of an array of policies of its
member states, from capital movements and transactions to
environmental standards.56
The problem of enforcement capacity is particularly evident when
there is a lack of proper technical, administrative, and financial means.
50. Kal Raustiala, Reporting and Review Institutions, in D. Zaelke, et al.
MAKING LAW WORK 227 (2005), reprinted in DAVID HUNTER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 393, 395 (4th ed. 2011).
51. Id. at 395–96.
52. Id. at 396.
53. Id.
54. See INT’L L. ORG., MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR STANDARDS: THE KEY ROLE OF THE ILO COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE
APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9–10 (2019),
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/publication/wcms_730866.pdf [hereinafter MONITORING
COMPLIANCE] (discussing the ILO’s Committee of Experts within its supervisory
system, which serves to analyze the application of labor standards).
55. See Abram Chayes et al., Managing Compliance: A Comparative
Perspective, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 41, 44 (Harold Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss eds.,
1998) (noting that these organizations often take actions that would be cost
prohibitive for domestic governments to incentivize compliance).
56. See Raustiala, supra note 49, at 395–96 (noting that the OECD conducts
independent reviews of its member countries); see also id. at 41–42 (distinguishing
formal dispute resolution processes from parallel processes, which better promote
cooperation).
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International organizations, and particularly IFIs (the World Bank,
IMF, and many others), offer technical assistance to develop
compliance with regard to every issue.57 In developing countries,
capacity building is paramount in promoting the implementation of
international agreements and policies.58 Assistance is generally
conditional on improving domestic performance.59 For instance, the
Climate Fund of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the
Montreal Protocol multilateral fund, and the Global Environmental
Facility provide technical and financial mechanisms to facilitate
compliance in developing countries.60
In the environmental field, financial and technological support for
countries in need promote implementation of the provisions of
agreements.61 Article 4.5 of the United National Framework
Convention on Climate Change provides that developed countries are
required to promote and facilitate financial and technological
assistance to developing countries in order to support compliance
capacity.62
C. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES INDEVELOPMENT FINANCE
The classifications of “developed” and “developing” apply to a state
in a precise moment and are subject to the changing dynamics of
growth and development.63 The classification process is flexible and
57. Hunter et al., supra note 34, at 410–11 (illustrating various implementation
assistance strategies).
58. See Chayes et al., supra note 54, at 53 (highlighting the importance of
addressing inadequacies that hinder compliance).
59. See id.
60. See id.; see also Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of
International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1855 (2002) (focusing on the analysis
of substantive content of international provisions).
61. See Joyeeta Gupta, Legitimacy in the Real World: A Case Study of the
Developing Countries, Non-Governmental Organizations, and Climate Change, in
THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 482, 490 (Jean-Marc
Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., U.N. Univ. Press, 2001) (pointing that the
developed nations were expected to assist the developing nations financially and
technologically for proper implementation of agreements).
62. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4, ¶ 5, May
9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
63. See Jac C. Heckelman et al., Crossing the Threshold: An Analysis of IBRD
Graduation Policy 3 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Policy Research Working
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holistic; it is a forward-looking exercise that allows assessment of the
profiles of IFIs’ member states as they evolve.64 For this reason, IFIs
use graduated policies to identify countries that are eligible to be
borrowers.65
Under World Bank regulations, depending on countries’ level of
advancement they are eligible to borrow from either the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or the
International Development Association (IDA).66 In order to provide
affordable financing solutions tailored to countries’ needs, the IBRD
provides loans to middle-income developing countries, while the IDA
provides loans and grants to the world’s poorest countries.67
According to the IBRD graduated policy, countries remain eligible as
borrowers until they are able to sustain their development process and
long-term growth without further recourse to bank financing.68 Thus,
the IBRD takes a holistic approach that takes into consideration not
only the income level of a country but also the institutional
development and capital-market access of those within it.69 Domestic
sovereign wealth, market creditworthiness, institutional development,
and a resilience grade are the main indicators used by the IBRD to
determine whether a country is ready to be graduated or de-
graduated.70 Similarly, in order to determine members’ eligibility, the
Paper No. 5531, 2011), https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-
5531 (explaining how differing levels of development can be indicative of a state’s
achievements, as well as its eligibility for borrowing from financial institutions).
64. See id. at 3–4 (outlining the criteria underlying the development
classification process).
65. See id. at 4 (explaining that the graduation process of development status acts
as milestones for assessing financial management and lending).
66. See id. at 2 (discussing the link between a state’s development graduation
and its eligibility for borrowing).
67. SeeWorld Bank, Review of IDA’s Graduation Policy, at 2, Doc. No. 103835
(Mar. 1, 2016),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/605191468191042391/Review-of-
IDA-s-graduation-policy (explaining that states may remain vulnerable to relapse
even after surpassing IDA’s operational cutoff).
68. Heckelman et al., supra note 62, at 2.
69. See id. at 3 (identifying a country’s level of development and overall
economic situation and a country’s capacity to sustain long-term development
without further recourse to the World Bank’s financial resources as the two key
factors to the policy).
70. See id. at 9–10 (detailing how the indicators differ between the two samples
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IDA applies technical criteria and carefully evaluates the status of its
members.71 First, the IDA graduation policy takes into account the
complete absence of creditworthiness, along with a concept of relative
poverty, measured by gross national income (GNI) per capita below
its operational cutoff, which corresponds to US$1,215.72 Moreover,
the IDA takes into account a series of other indicators related to
poverty and shared prosperity, human development, climate
vulnerability, and domestic revenue mobilization.73 Thus, under
World Bank graduation policies, each country’s performance is
tracked to ensure informed and accurate graduation decisions.74
D. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEWORLD BANK’S “POLITICAL
PROHIBITION”
IFI operations may take place in the context of a difficult domestic
scene in which the human rights protection framework may be
hindered. Because IFIs have a purely economic mandate, theymay not
intervene in the internal political affairs of states. The IBRD’s Article
of Agreements includes a “political prohibition” that requires avoiding
any sort of interference with the political affairs of member states in
order to preserve the principle of domestic jurisdiction.75
In September 2015, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extreme
used in the World Bank’s study, pointing that shocks of banking crises reduced the
likelihood of graduating by about 1.2 for Sample 1 and 1.5 for Sample 2 ).
71. SeeWorld Bank, supra note 66, at 2 (including absence of creditworthiness
and the concept of relative poverty as the underlying principles).
72. See id.; see also Anton Dobronogov et al., Moving Up the Ladder: An
Analysis of IDA Graduation Policy 14 (World Bank Group, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 9208, 2020),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33582.
73. See World Bank, supra note 66, at 7 (outlining the variety of indicators in
Table 2 of the report).
74. See id. at 3 (explaining that in theWorld Bank Group context, some countries
are classified as “gap” countries, whereby these countries receive their allocation on
blended terms, resulting in higher reflows to the IDA).
75. Articles of Agreement of the IBRD art. 4, § 10, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440,
2 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter IBRD Articles of Agreement] (“The Bank and its
officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be
influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members
concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and
these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes
stated in Article I.”).
2020] IFIS&THEIRHR SILENT AGENDA 67
poverty and human rights, Philip Alston, described the World Bank as
a “human rights–free zone” – an anachronistic and inconsistent
interpretation of its mandate.76 Constrained by the formalistic
approach of its Articles of Agreement, the Bank is prevented from
piercing the veil of states’ political sovereignty.77 According to
Alston’s critique, the Bank’s “political prohibition” impedes
embracing human rights as a universal value and aligning with
corresponding legal obligations.78
The Bank’s “political prohibition” is founded on the principle of
domestic jurisdiction, which defines the boundaries between the
national and international spheres.79 Since the beginning of the modern
international community, the enlargement of international law – with
the growing pervasiveness of international organizations – has
intruded on states’ sovereignty by means of the obligations each state
has undertaken internationally.80 Domestic jurisdiction is a corollary
principle of states’ sovereignty. It recognizes the exclusive
competence of a state within its territory over all matters subject to
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, without external
limitations.81 Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter regulates domestic
jurisdiction with a view toward peaceful cooperation between states.82
76. OHCHR, “The World Bank is a Human Rights-Free Zone” – UN Expert on
Extreme Poverty Expresses Deep Concern (Sept. 29, 2015),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16517
&LangID=E.
77. See Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human
Rights), Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights,
2, 5, U.N. Doc. A/70/274 (Aug. 4, 2015) (explaining that as a result of the “political
prohibition,” the World Bank is unable to engage with or assist member countries
with human rights obligations).
78. Id. at 6.
79. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS: WITH SUPPLEMENT 769-70 (2000) (“Nothing
contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. . . .”).
80. See id. at 770–71 (arguing that the basic idea that matters are solely within
the domestic jurisdiction of a state is “erroneous”).
81. U.N. Charter art. 2, ⁋ 7; see Satvinder S. Juss, Nationality Law, Sovereignty,
and the Doctrine of Exclusive Domestic Jurisdiction 9 FLA. J. INT’L L. 219, 224–27
(1994) (stating that “sovereignty is directly linked to the independence of States and
as such espouse the doctrine that it cannot be subject to any external interference”).
82 U.N. Charter art. 2, ⁋ 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
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It excludes a priori U.N. intervention on issues covered by domestic
jurisdiction, except those related to the Security Council’s role in the
maintenance of international security pursuant to Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter.82 As a result, preservation of peace, an absolute,
intangible principle, sets the limits for the invocation of domestic
jurisdiction.83 Today, increasing global challenges have resulted in a
growing interplay between the domestic and international spheres.
The expansion of human rights doctrines, along with the
intensification of interstate commerce and trans-boundary issues (such
as those related to the climate and environment), has required a global
response.84
With the evolution of international law with respect to interference
with sovereignty, human rights protection is in line with new
principles that tend to give priority to global concerns.85 An overall
reasonableness test should be applied to balance sovereign
prerogatives and human rights imperatives. This idea has increasingly
been realized as a human rights dimension of development finance, as
IFIs continue to fulfill an important role in assisting member states to
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”).
82. U.N. Charter arts. 39–51.
83. See Kelsen, supra note 78, at 769–70 (citing the Summary Report of the 16th
meeting of Committee I/i (U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 976, I/i/40, P. 1)); see also LELANDM.
GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND
DOCUMENTS 67–68 (3rd ed. 1969) (comparing the narrow, technical interpretation
against the layman’s interpretation of intervention into domestic jurisdiction);
FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL
SETTING 892–93 (2d ed. 1993) (explaining that the domestic jurisdiction system fell
short of creating an international bill of rights and did not set the stage for a
meaningful human rights effort).
84. See R.P. Singh, Globalization and Human Rights, in APPLIED ETHICS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND CONTEXTUAL APPLICATIONS 318,
320–22 (Shashi Motilal ed., 2010) (explaining how the rise of globalization has
“challenged the nation/state territorial sovereignty, the institutional autonomy[,] and
shrinking of the concepts of space and time”).
85. See Josh Delbrueck, International Protection of Human Rights and State
Sovereignty, 57 IND. L.J. 567, 571–72 (1982) (explaining that the General Assembly
established that the “principle of nonintervention does not apply to questions of
human rights violations” without discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or
nationality).
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meet their international human rights commitments.86 In this respect,
IFIs play a fundamental role in domestic legal systems, acting as a sort
of compensatory bridge between the international and local levels.87
Consequently, IFIs’ advisory support of member states is effective,
coherent guidance in domestic policies and it furthers legal and
institutional capacity building, thus fostering a state’s duty to protect.
III. IFIS’ OBLIGATION TO RESPECT HUMAN
RIGHTS
IFIs’ obligation to respect human rights is the second pillar in the
Protect, Respect and Remedy model for bridging the gap between
development finance and human rights.88 IFIs’ engagement in human
rights protection exists independently of states’ duty to protect.89
There is a distinction, therefore, between the rules of international law
86. See Klaus Decker et al., Human Rights and Equitable Development:
“Ideals”, Issues and Implications 16–21 (World Dev. Rep., Working Paper, 2005)
(detailing the development of human rights from the traditional visions to the
convergence of human rights); SANAE FUJITA, THE WORLD BANK, ASIAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DEVELOPING STANDARDS OF
TRANSPARENCY, PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 41 (2013) (explaining that
the World Bank did not use the term “human rights” until the mid-1990s); Frank
Biermann et al., Studying the Influence of International Bureaucracies: A
Conceptual Framework, in MANAGERS OF GLOBAL CHANGE: THE INFLUENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL BUREAUCRACIES 37, 53 (Frank Biermann &
Bernd Siebenhüner eds., 2009) (suggesting that the scope of governmental
regulation of activities increases with more resources); Barry Herman, The Politics
of Inclusion in the Monterrey Process, in THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION IN
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOVERNANCE 153, 155–57, 175 (Jessica F. Green &
W. Bradnee Chambers eds., U.N. Univ. Press 2006) (stating that the Monterrey
Process led to codification of soft issues like rights of children and gender equality
in the 2015 Millennium Declaration of the General Assembly); ANDREWCLAPHAM,
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 140–41 (2006) (detailing
U.S. legislation that provides assistance to countries “other than those whose
governments engage in [a] pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights”); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Human Rights, Development, and
International Financial Institutions, 8 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 27, 29–30 (1992)
(opining that the World Bank is viewed as an “agency for economic development”
that has reached issues such as population, education, health, and social security).
87. See Decker et al., supra note 86, at 19–21 (detailing the convergence of
human rights and the shifts in development thinking).
88. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 8, at 13–15.
89. Id. at 13.
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regarding states’ responsibility and the rules for IFIs’ commitments
and obligations.90
This section analyzes the context in which IFIs operate, their
activities, and the risks they face in the human rights sphere. IFIs
evolved from being spectators to being actors in the promotion of
human rights in developing countries.91 In the international legal
framework, the evolution of scholarly debate on human rights and
development finance has reflected the rise of a rights-based approach
to development.92A human rights agenda has gained greater resonance
in business models and development finance and IFIs’ governance has
evolved.93 The recent launch of the ESF represents the tip of the spear
90. Id. at 6–22.
91. See Adam McBeth, A Right by any Other Name: The Evasive Engagement
of International Financial Institutions Within Human Rights, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 1101, 1102–03 (2008) (suggesting IFIs have drastically changed their view
on human rights taking a more positive role).
92. United Nations Development Group, The Human Rights Based Approach to
Development Cooperation Towards a Common Understanding Among UN
Agencies, at 1–2 (2003), https://unsdg.un.org/resources/human-rights-based-
approach-development-cooperation-towards-common-understanding-among-un
[hereinafter HRBA] (following a trend that began in previous decades, by the end of
1990s, the United Nations began to mainstream human rights in its programs and
policies, developing a “common understanding” of a human rights–based approach
grounded on six main principles: (1) universality and inalienability, (2)
indivisibility, (3) inter-dependence and inter-relatedness, (4) equality and non-
discrimination, (4) participation and inclusion, and (6) accountability and the rule of
law).
93. See Siobhán McInerney-Lankford & Hans-Otto Sano, Human Rights
Indicators in Development: An Introduction, 3–4, IBRD Doc No. 57884 (2010)
(discussing the promotion of human rights standards in international development);
see also McBeth, supra note 91, at 1102, 1114–19 (providing the actions of the
World Bank to demonstrate IFIs’ evolved attitude towards human rights); PETER
UVIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT 122 (2004) (defining the rights-based
approach to development as a new paradigm adopted by agencies); Canan Gunduz,
Human Rights and Development: The World Bank’s Need for a Consistent Approach
3, 17–19 (Dev. Stud. Inst., Working Paper Series, Paper No. 04-49, 2004) (noting
the World Bank’s integration of human rights language to define goals of
development); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 10 (1999) (including
political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency
guarantees, and protective security as the five distinct types of freedom). See
generally, J. Herman Burgers & Rob Kroes, Introduction Item: Social
Transformation and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST WORLD:
INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES 167–68 (Jan Berting et al. eds., 1990) (arguing
that to “understand the development and implementation of human rights . . . it is
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in the mainstreaming of human rights in the context of IFIs.94
The evolution of the U.N. agenda toward sustainability enhanced
development policies and practices with respect to human rights,
individuating duty bearers and rights holders.95 A substantial
conception of human rights became embedded in development finance
paradigms, promoting transparency, empowerment, participation, and
non-discrimination.96
In line with the 2030 sustainable agenda, IFIs play a crucial role in
strengthening the system of multilateral cooperation with respect to
environmental and social standards, providing broad representation,
clear mandates, and effective tools.97 They provide backing for
international and domestic governance that aim for a better balance
between development and preservation of the environment, promoting
more justice, cohesion, and equality among societies and peoples.98
A. IFIS: ACTORS OR SPECTATORS IN THEHUMAN RIGHTS
FRAMEWORK?
To analyze human rights in development finance, it is important to
define the role and scope of IFIs in the international development
framework. IFIs’ mission can be seen as the dual goal of ending
extreme poverty and fostering economic growth through shared
prosperity.99 While there is no doubt that the human rights dimension
necessary to study the power and exchange relationships behind the rhetoric of
human rights”).
94. See Environmental & Social Framework, supra note 6, at 1–2 (highlighting
the World Bank’s increased focus on financing projects with a human rights aspect).
95. See, e.g., HRBA, supra note 92, at 2–3 (noting how “[p]rogrammes of
development cooperation contribute to the development of the capacities of duty-
bearers . . . and of ‘right-holders’”).
96. See McInerney-Lankford & Sano, supra note 93, at 31 (highlighting the
“identifiable convergence around principles,” including transparency,
empowerment, participation, and non-discrimination).
97. See U.N. Secretary-General, Roadmap for Financing the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development, 20–39 (July 4, 2019),
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/UN-SG-
Roadmap-Financing-the-SDGs-July-2019.pdf [hereinafter Roadmap] (outlining the
engagement strategy between the UN and various IFIs).
98. See, e.g., McInerney-Lankford & Sano, supra note 93, at 3–4 (describing the
widespread and multi-faceted concept of development).
99. See, e.g., Articles of Agreement of the IMF art. 1, § 2, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat.
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is pertinent to the general goals of development finance, how to
remove the obstacles between these two spheres of international law
is still in question.100
From an historical perspective, after the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system101, Bretton Woods institutions continued to function
actively in the international community.102 Nevertheless, the evolution
of international relations, with the increasing significance of
sustainability, has triggered new challenges to the point that the
Washington-based system of development finance seems to be in
question.103 In this framework, can fundamental values of the
1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (providing that one of the purposes of the International
Monetary Fund is “[t]o facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international
trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of
employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of
all members as primary objectives of economic policy”); IBRD Articles of
Agreement, supra note 74, art. 1, §§ 1–3 (explaining the purposes of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development).
100. See Bradlow, supra note 1, at 201 (describing one perspective on the aims of
social and environmental policies of IFIs); see also Uzan, supra note 1, at 429
(contemplating the role of public interest within the context of growing IFIs);
Franck, supra note 32, at 413–14, 436 (highlighting the influence of wealth disparity
on various perspectives on development goals).
101. See DAVIDM. ANDREWS, ORDERLY CHANGE: INTERNATIONALMONETARY
RELATIONS SINCE BRETTON WOODS 9–10, 13–15 (David M. Andrews ed. 2011)
(providing necessary background related to the Bretton Woods system).
102. See id. at 9–10 (describing the continued importance of the Bretton Woods
instrumentalities).
103. See, e.g., Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and
the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1944–
46 (1997) (outlining the effect that transnational institutions have on US national
sovereignty); see also Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory,
and International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 959–60 (2000) (book review)
(describing how “legal principles of sovereignty” have shifted since World War II);
ENRIQUE R. CARRASCO, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 68 (2015) (examining the extent to
which the Bretton Woods Institutions are obligated to consider “human rights and
the environment in their operations”); DAVIDHELD, DEMOCRACY AND THEGLOBAL
ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE 281 (1995)
(describing the role equity in political institutions plays in the formation of a
“cosmopolitan democratic community”); POLITY PRESS & OPEN UNIV., THE
TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY?: GLOBALIZATION AND TERRITORIAL
DEMOCRACY 16, 21 (Anthony G. McGrew ed., 1997) (providing a framework for
understanding the contemporary debate surrounding the “democratization of world
order”); Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for
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international community serve as the beacon for evolution? In
particular, what is the role of human rights in the sphere of
development finance?
The evolution of the legal landscape pertaining to fundamental
rights protection in development finance, along with the economic
expansion of capital and financial markets, has generated a legal
vacuum in global governance, especially with regard to protection of
common goods.104 Since the rise of the rights-based approach in
international development, states and IFIs have strived to include
sustainable solutions in developmental investments through policies
and projects.105
IFIs’ mission has evolved to serve a broader concept of
development.106 Since the 1970s and 1980s, the growth of economic
relations has been connected to respect for human rights obligations,
as recognized by the Commission on Human Rights in 1977107 and by
the U.N. General Assembly through the Declaration on the Right to
Development of 1986.108While not formally labeling it a “rights-based
International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 7, 8–12 (1997) (outlining the
impact that global capitalism has had on individual state authority).
104. See Uzan, supra note 1, at 409–10 (stating that “[t]he emerging consensus
reaffirms a world economy based on free market mechanisms . . . buttressed by
sound national financial systems and by good public and corporate governance”).
105. See UNDP, Human Rights in UNDP: Practice Note, 15 (Apr. 2005),
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/HRPN_English.pdf [hereinafter UNDP]
(describing the human rights-based approach to development and nothing the desire
for “[d]evelopment interventions . . . [to] become more sustainable, through the
explicit emphasis on accountability in decision-making and participation”).
106. See e.g., id. (highlighting the evolution of the debate on human rights in
international development); see also Decker et al., supra note 86, at 16–21
(summarizing the history and convergence of human rights and development); Mary
Dowell-Jones, Financial Institutions and Human Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 423,
464–67 (2013) (providing a summary of the changes in the guiding principles of
various financial institutions); UVIN, supra note 93, at 60–61 (analyzing how rights-
based approaches to development have caused people to reframe their thinking
surrounding development strategies and methods).
107. Comm’n on Human Rights, Econ. and Soc. Council, Rep. on the Thirty-
Third Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1257, supp. no. 6, at 74–75 (Feb. 21, 1977)
(noting, among other preambulatory and operative clauses, that “the full
implementation of economic . . . rights is of crucial importance for the real and
meaningful enjoyment of civil and political rights”).
108. See G.A. Res. 41/128, annex, at 186–87 (Dec. 4, 1986) (laying out the UN
General Assembly’s perspective on the “right to development”).
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approach,” the European Union has since the 1990s played a major
role in the mainstreaming of human rights content in its trade and
cooperation policies, through a positive and constructive approach, to
promote sustainable development, peace, and stability.109
In this evolution, the international agenda has been to promote
human rights principles in multilateral forums, setting the pace for the
evolution of core values in the international community.110 Today, the
U.N. Sustainable Development Goals, along with other instruments,
are determining the rules of the game in which IFIs are tasked to play
a major role, with a constant balance between social long-term
objectives and short-term market needs.111
Given the complexity and dynamics of development finance, it is
important to shed light on several critical aspects of reducing or
compensating for governmental gaps related to human rights. Besides
the moral imperative, as former senior vice president and general
counsel Roberto Dañino said, human rights are progressively
becoming an explicit and integral part of the World Bank’s work.112
109. See Marise Cremona, Human Rights and Democracy Clauses in the EC’s
Trade Agreements, in THE EUROPEANUNION ANDWORLD TRADE LAW: AFTER THE
GATT URUGUAY ROUND 105–08 (Nicholas Emiliou & David O’Keeffe eds., 1996)
(pointing out the increased frequency of human rights and democracy clauses in the
European Community’s various trade agreements); see also Eibe Riedel & Martin
Will, Human Rights Clauses in External Agreements of the EC, in THE EU AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 723, 723, 740 (Philip Alston ed., 2000) (commenting on the
incorporation of human rights clauses into European agreements).
110. See G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 2, ¶¶ 3, 8, 19 (including the promotion of
human rights in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development).
111. See Hassane Cissé, Should the Political Prohibition in Charters of
International Financial Institutions be Revisited? in 3 THE WORLD BANK LEGAL
REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL LEGAL
GOVERNANCE 59, 72–73, No. 65371 (Hassane Cissé et al. eds., 2012) (describing
how the increased focus on human rights has caused the World Bank to reexamine
its perspective on various issues); see also Uzan, supra note 1, at 418–19
(emphasizing the interaction between short and long-term economic goals, and the
need to address both through sound national and international policies); HORATIA
MUIR WATT, ASPECTS ÉCONOMIQUES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ:
RÉFLEXIONS SUR L’IMPACT DE LA GLOBALISATION ÉCONOMIQUE SUR LES
FONDEMENTS DES CONFLITS DE LOIS ET DE JURIDICTIONS 43 (2005) (outlining the
need for balance between legal regulations and market flexibility); Kirgis, supra
note 83, at 920, 961 (explaining the importance of creating space for both national
and international economic development).
112. Robert Dañino, The Legal Aspects of the World Bank’s Work on Human
2020] IFIS&THEIRHR SILENT AGENDA 75
Mutatis mutandis, the same considerations can be applied to other
developmental organizations. With the rights-based approach to
development, along with human development, challenges in
international development have changed and the mission of IFIs has
progressively broadened.113
IFIs have indirectly engaged in the human rights debate, embracing
social and environmental rights and thus silently overcoming their
“political prohibition.”114 Piloting new approaches to speed up
operational delivery, the World Bank sought to improve sustainability
through an array of initiatives, including flexible political and
regulatory instruments to be implemented in its operations.115With the
development of the new ESF, the Bank took into consideration not
only risk and return in its investment strategies but also the impact of
its projects and policies.116
B. THEWORLD BANK’S SAFEGUARD POLICIES AND THENEW
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK
As the World Bank has evolved on a path of commitment to human
rights, it has moved through the years from a passive to an active role
in respecting and promoting them.117 The concrete results of this can
be seen in the evolution of the Bank’s Safeguard Policies, which
resulted in the recent approval of the ESF, the Bank’s larger reform
Rights, 41 INT’LLAW. 21, 24 (2007) (“I strongly believe that an objective assessment
of the work of the Bank leads inevitably to the conclusion that it has made a
substantial positive contribution to the realization of human rights, and will
increasingly continue to do so.”).
113. See Decker et al., supra note 86, at 20 (describing the “convergence of
human rights and development”).
114. Daniel D. Bradlow & Claudio Grossman, Limited Mandates and Intertwined
Problems: A New Challenge for the World Bank and the IMF, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 411,
430–32 (1995) (“[w]ith each new interpretation of its developmental mandate, the
Bank has . . . narrowed its interpretation of the scope of political prohibition.”).
115. See Environmental and Social Framework, supra note 6, at 1–3 (presenting
the World Bank’s initiatives related to the promotion of sustainable development).
116. See id., at 1–6 (evaluating the development initiatives put forth by the World
Bank by analyzing the social and environmental risks of the programs, among other
things).
117. See Dañino, supra note 112, at 22–24 (emphasizing how the World Bank’s
mandate has evolved over time).
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effort to improve and streamline its work.118
Since the early 1980s, civil society has increasingly strived to
secure sustainability in international development. In the development
finance context, this phenomenon has led to the advancement of
human and environmental protection in IFIs’ policies and projects.119
Following this trend, the World Bank began working in the 1980s on
internal operational policies to guide its staff. This process led to the
approval and then the implementation of the first Safeguard Policies
in 1998.120 From the beginning, Safeguard Policies intended to protect
people and the environment from the adverse effects of Bank-financed
operations have operated even in absentia of domestic protection in
the borrower country’s legal systems.121 They set standards and
procedures that apply both to the borrower and the Bank in its
investment projects and lending program.122 Specifically, they were
118. See Cristina Passoni et al., Empowering the Inspection Panel: The Impact of
the World Bank’s New Environmental and Social Safeguards, 49 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.
& POL. 921, 922–23, 926 (2017) (illustrating the effects of the World Bank’s social
safeguard policies).
119. See Elchin Amirbayov (Vice-President and Rapporteur, Azerbaijan), Report
of the Human Rights Council on its Ninth Session, 9, 43–44, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/28
(Dec. 2, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Report] (advocating for the financial and
technological support for the Special Rapporteur to carry out its mandate on
protecting human rights); OECD Secretary-General, Conflict and Fragility: Do No
Harm: International Support for Statebuilding, 55, 107, 110–11 (2010) [hereinafter
Do No Harm] (discussing the role of Donor Countries in state building with an
emphasis on protecting human rights and the environmental sustainability measures
coupled with growth for investors and labor workers); Jomo Kwame Sundaram &
Anis Chowdhury, Introduction: Governance and Development, in IS GOOD
GOVERNANCE GOOD FOR DEVELOPMENT? 15, 20–21 (Jomo Kwame Sundaram &
Anis Chowdhury eds., 2012) (noting the challenges developing countries face when
donor countries attach governance quality indicators and policy presumptions as a
condition for receiving development aid); Nolan, supra note 28, at 7, 8–9
(identifying the developing narrative on corporate responsibility for respecting
human rights, the inadequacies of international human rights law and state-centric
frameworks to redress corporate rights violations, and the NGOs that fill the gaps to
protect workers).
120. BRETTON WOODS PROJECT, SAFEGUARD POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE
STANDARDS (Sept. 22, 2009), https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2009/09/art-
565324/.
121. Id.
122. See id. (noting the safeguard policies in ten key environmental and social
policies classified under the following rubric: (1) environmental assessment, (2)
natural habitats, (3) pest management, (4) indigenous peoples, (5) involuntary
2020] IFIS&THEIRHR SILENT AGENDA 77
tailored to identify, avoid, and minimize harms to people and the
environment, awakening the sensibility of borrowing governments
with regard to environmental and social risks as they receive funds for
development projects.123
The safeguards affirmed their role in the IBRD’s and IDA’s
operations as a cornerstone of their support for the effective realization
of the twin goals of ending extreme poverty and promoting shared
prosperity.124 Despite not formally engaging with human rights, the
Bank sought to provide broader protection in its financed operations
to affected people who are particularly vulnerable to financial
investment prerogatives.125 Safeguards have often been used as an
resettlement, (6) forestry, (7) safety of dams, (8) projects on international waterways,
(9) projects in disputed areas, and (10) cultural property.)
123. See David B. Hunter, Civil Society Networks and the Development of
Environmental Standards at International Financial Institutions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L.
437, 439–42 (2008) (discussing the environmental assessments of projects before
financing projects and its key features) (noting the relevant provisions of The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights form an International Bill of Rights); see e.g., François Gianviti,
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Monetary Fund, in
NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 113, 113–14 (Philip Alston ed., 2005)
(noting the relevant provisions of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights form an International Bill of
Rights); Annie Petsonk, Legal Obligations and Institutions of Developing
Countries: Rethinking Approaches to Forest Governance, in 3 THEWORLD BANK
LEGAL REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL LEGAL
GOVERNANCE, 293, 313–16, Doc No. 65371, (Hassane Cissé et al. eds., 2012)
(reviewing the Coalition for Rainforest Nations efforts to compensate nations for
reducing emissions from deforestation in the Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation in Developing Countries program as an effective tool to foster the idea
that protecting against deforestation can be economically beneficial for developing
countries); Dowell-Jones, supra note 106, at 437–38 (highlighting how the Equator
Principles Financial Institutions committed to ensuring “that borrowers have
conducted and environmental and social impact assessment of the proposed project”
to mitigate against the negative effects on human rights and the environment from
international project finance).
124. WBG, Review and Update of the World Bank’s Safeguard Policies:
Environmental and Social Framework (Proposed Third Draft), at 1, 7, Rep. No.




125. See Bradlow, supra note 1, 15 n.55 (noting that the Bank’s considerations of
human rights and its support for members to fulfill human rights obligations may be
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alternative tool to fill the legal vacuum of domestic systems, which
might leave unprotected critical spheres of human rights law, such as
land expropriation, labor rights, and environmental requirements.126
Likewise, 1) the field of social corporate responsibility, 2) the states’
duty to protect, and 3) the corporate responsibility to respect are
constructs that together provide effectiveness in fragile domestic legal
systems, identifying duty bearers and rights holders.127
In 2016, the World Bank approved the new ESF, which was then
implemented in October 2018.128 It aimed to renew its safeguards and
embed a broader protection for environmental and social rights while
furthering inclusion and participation.129 The ESF applies to all new
World Bank investment project financing, while existing projects
based on assessment of the economic impact).
126. See WBG, Guidance Note for Borrowers – ESS5: Land Acquisition,




Resettlement-English.pdf [hereinafter ESF Guidance Note 5] (requiring the Bank’s
Borrowers to develop a framework compatible with the Environment and Social
Standards on land acquisition, restrictions on land use and involuntary resettlement
to protect the human rights of those who are physically displaced as a result of
project finance).
127. See OHCHR, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An
Interpretive Guide, 1, 10–14 (2012),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/publications/hr.puB.12.2_en.pdf [hereinafter
Corporate Responsibility] (discussing the relevance of human rights to states and
business and obligation corporations have to respecting human rights); see also Ana
Čertanec, The Connection Between Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate
Respect for Human Rights, 10 DANUBE 103, 107 (2013) (explaining how the duty to
respect, protect and fulfill human rights transitioned from being solely applicable to
states, to being applied to non-state actors that are subject to international law and
the international legal order).
128. See WBG, World Bank Board Approves New Environmental and Social
Framework (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2016/08/04/world-bank-board-approves-new-environmental-and-social-
framework?cid=ECR_E_NewsletterWeekly_EN_EXT [hereinafter World Bank
Board] (reporting that the Bank approved a new Environmental and Social
Framework, expanding the protections for people and the environment for Bank-
financed projects).
129. See Passoni et al., supra note 118, at 922 (recognizing the goal of the Bank’s
review of its environmental and social safeguard policies was to modernize and
enhance efficiency for the Bank and Borrowers).
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continue to apply the previous Safeguards Policies.130 The two systems
will run in parallel for an estimated seven years.131
The ESF consists of a due diligence process that is key to addressing
human rights-related challenges in development finance operations
while mitigating the adverse impact of policies and projects.132 It
ensures its political sustainability through the harmonization of market
dynamics and social needs.133 With this internal reform, the Bank
created a systematic regulation, within a single framework, that
embraces a plurality of instruments: (i) the Bank’s Vision for
sustainable development; (ii) the Environmental and Social Policy for
Investment, with requirements that apply to the Bank; (iii)
Environmental and Social Standards, with requirements that apply to
borrowers; and (iv) the Bank Directive on Addressing Risks and
Impacts on Disadvantaged or Vulnerable Individuals or Groups.134
The ESF is the result of an intra-institutional model of rulemaking
that combines the interests of different stakeholders within the
sustainable development debate.135 Indeed, it is the result of an intense
negotiation process between civil society organizations, the Bank, and
its borrowers.136 On the one hand, civil society, along with donor
130. See WBG, Environmental and Social Policies,
https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/environmental-and-social-
policies (last visited June 19, 2020) (noting the duration of the Environmental and
Social Framework, which is to begin on October 1, 2018); Passoni et al., supra note
118, at 923 (noting that the for the first seven years the Environmental and Social
Framework will run parallel to the existing safeguards).
131. Id.
132. See Environmental and Social Framework, supra note 6, at 3–7 (noting the
Banks objectives and principles for the Environmental and Social Standards and the
Banks commitment to conduct due diligence on all projects supported by Investment
Project Financing).
133. See id. at 91–92 (recognizing the Bank’s support for developing domestic
capital and financial markets).
134. See Environmental and Social Policies, supra note 130 (discussing what
constitutes the Bank’s Environmental and Social Framework).
135. See Giedre Jokubauskaite, The World Bank Environmental and Social
Framework in a Wider Realm of Public International Law, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
457, 459 (2019) (analyzing how the Environmental and Social Framework reforms
differed from the traditional template of interstate law-making because the reforms
were the result of a global deliberation bringing together different stakeholders).
136. See WBG, Archive of Environmental and Social Framework (ESF):
Guidance Notes Comment Period Web Page 2017,
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countries, pushed for a more stringent regulation, while on the other
hand borrowers advocated for their sovereign freedom in using
developmental aid and investments, striving to elude the imposition of
conditions.137
The result was a compromise that establishes a cooperative
relationship between the Bank and its borrowers.138 The ESF sets out
the requirements for client countries with regard to the identification
and assessment of environmental and social risks related to the Bank’s
projects.139 The application of these standards seeks to enhance the
twin goals, directly benefiting the environment and local
populations.140 This strategy recognizes that developing economies
need to grow through sustainability in order to mitigate fundamental
threats to development.141 First, it seeks to lower carbon emissions in
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/186931549556754791/ESF-Guidance-Notes-
Comments-Web-Page-2017-archive.pdf (last visited June 19, 2020) [hereinafter
ESF Guidance Notes Comment Period] (presenting the various draft guidance notes
from organizations and stakeholders on the Environmental Social Standards of the
Bank); Letter to the World Bank on the Environmental and Social Standards
Guidance Notes, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/04/letter-world-bank-environmental-and-
social-standards-guidance-notes (last visited June 21, 2020) [hereinafter Letter to the
World Bank] (expressing concerns for the draft Guidance Notes for Borrowers).
137. See Bradlow, supra note 1, at 202–04 (discussing how the participants in the
policy-making process engage with the Bank and the various conflicts over the
administrative process of negotiations develop and are subsequently resolved).
138. See Environmental and Social Framework, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that the
Bank will collaborate with Borrowers to address national development priorities
through cooperative relationships with Borrowers, donors, and other international
organizations).
139. See id at x, n.6 (identifying when Environmental and Social Standard ESS1
is applicable to Bank Investment Project Financing and the four important points the
ESS1 establishes).
140. See ESF Third Draft, supra note 124, at 1, 7 (presenting the Bank’s
overarching goals to end extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity and the
methods the Bank will use to achieve these goals).
141. See U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL SURVEY 2013: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES, at xvii, U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/344, U.N. Sales No. E.13.II.C.1 (2013),
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2843WESS2013.pdf
[hereinafter WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SURVEY] (showing that the sustainable
development of cities will require local and national authorities to cooperate on
public infrastructure projects).
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order to decarbonize and invest in resilience.142 Second, it seeks
empowerment of all people who participate in and benefit from the
development process and promotes inclusion and equality.143 In this
way, through an identification and assessment of environmental and
social risk, the new framework makes important advances in areas
such as transparency, non-discrimination, public participation, and
accountability for the benefit of the environment and citizens.144
The launch of the ESF operationalized these principles into
practical project-level applications within the framework of the
Bank’s Articles of Agreement.145 This allowed both the Bank and
borrowers to undertake a deeper commitment to sustainable
development by sharing reciprocal responsibilities.146 Inasmuch as
these standards will be binding on borrowers, the Bank seeks to further
commit to environmental and social rights in development contexts by
enhancing the capacity of borrower countries’ systems.147 However,
142. See Environmental and Social Framework, supra note 6, at 1 (emphasizing
the importance of addressing climate change in sustainable development for long-
term economic growth and stability in developing countries).
143. See id. at 1–2 (highlighting the importance of social development and
inclusion for the Bank’s objective of achieving sustainable development, and
defining what inclusion means in this context).
144. See id. at ix (stating that the Bank aims to support Borrowers to reduce
poverty and increase prosperity sustainably by applying the Environmental and
Social Standards).
145. See id. at 2 (noting the Bank’s aspirational and potential broader impact on
sustainable development by applying the Environmental and Social Framework
standards).
146. See Michael M. Cernea & Julie K. Maldonado, Challenging the Prevailing
Paradigm of Displacement and Resettlement: Its Evolution, and Constructive Ways
of Improving it, in CHALLENGING THE PREVAILING PARADIGM OF DISPLACEMENT
AND RESETTLEMENT: RISKS, IMPOVERISHMENT, LEGACIES, SOLUTIONS 13–14
(Michael M. Cernea & Julia K. Maldonado eds., 2018) (discussing the Bank’s
changes to the development-caused forced displacement and resettlement policy that
ended the out-sourcing of resettling to local authorities, which resulted in the Bank
providing direct support and oversight of resettlement projects as integral to
development projects).
147. See WBG, Guidance Note for Borrowers – ESS1: Assessment and
Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impact, 1–2, (June 28, 2018),
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/142691530216729197/ESF-Guidance-Note-
1-Assessment-and-Management-of-Environmental-and-Social-Risks-and-Impacts-
English.pdf [hereinafter ESF Guidance Note 1] (identifying the Bank’s objective to
“promote improved environmental and social performance, in ways which recognize
and enhance Borrower capacity).
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they do not impose general legal obligations on states, as international
agreements do, since they create legal effects only through the
implementation of financing agreements.148
Even though the ESF falls in the category of internal administrative
law of an international organization, it has a major impact on
development governance.149 Tailored from a functional perspective,
the new standards derive their legal force from their impact on the
Bank and its borrowers.150 From a formalist perspective, the Bank
maintained aspirational language with regard to human rights, which
was heavily criticized by civil organizations during the consultation
phase.151As the Bank does not have a political mandate because of the
prohibition in its Articles of Agreement, it maintains its formal
commitment to human rights as a general aspiration.152 In this regard,
the Bank has been criticized for having a “soft” vision statement that
may result in basic respect for human rights eventually falling outside
its institutional mandate.153 Paradoxically, this would suggest that
respect for human rights could even be inconsistent with the Bank’s
Articles of Agreement.154Nonetheless, the Bank has furthered human
148. See Jokubauskaite, supra note 135, at 457 (discussing how the Banks
Environmental and Social Framework safeguard aims to protect the public and
environment from the negative effects of development financing).
149. See JOSE ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS
273–74, 276, 316–17, 319 (2005) (exploring how international organizations play a
role in the development of modern international treaties); Arend, supra note 27, at
129 (analyzing the role of institutions in the constructivist view of mutually-
constitutive relationships between structure and actor, which alter the identity and
interests of states by the states’ participation in institutions).
150. See Kerry Rittich, Functionalism and Formalism: Their Latest Incarnations
in Contemporary Development and Governance Debates, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 853,
857 (2005) (explaining that functionalism relies on “the allocation of legal
entitlements and responsibilities among different, social, legal, and political
institutions”).
151. See id. at 863–64 (illuminating that the formalist approach to development
only includes rule on the protection of property, contracts, and basic human safety);
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Submission: World Bank’s Second
Draft Environmental and Social Framework,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/04/letter-world-bank-environmental-and-
social-standards-guidance-notes (last visited June 21, 2020), [hereinafter Human
Rights Watch Submission].
152. See id. (recommending moving away from merely aspirational language).
153. Id.
154. See id.
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rights protection through tailored standards in the fields of
environment and biodiversity conservation, labor, resettlement,
indigenous people, and public participation.155 This way, using a
functionalist methodology, the Bank was able to expand its mandate
from the original scope of its Articles of Agreements, embracing a
more socially oriented-approach in its operations that grants
transparency and accessibility.156 In other words, it has furthered a
silent agenda of human rights through environmental and social
standards, in line with the new U.N. sustainable development agenda.
IV. ACCESS TO REMEDIES
Access to remedies is the third pillar of the tripartite model used in
this Article to assess human rights protection in development finance.
It promotes an understanding of IFIs’ level of accountability and, in
turn, paves the way for securing substantive justice in the
developmental context.
Accountability of IOs must be considered a “multifaceted
phenomenon,” according to the definition given by the International
Law Association.157 Effective remedies for human rights violations
play an important role in development finance.158 Indeed, access to
155. See Environmental and Social Standards (ESS), THE WORLD BANK,
www.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/environmental-and-social-
framework/brief/environmental-and-social-standards (last visited June 21, 2020)
(developing ten environmental and social standards on the following key topics: (1)
assessment and management of environmental and social risks and impacts, (2) labor
and working conditions, (3) resource efficiency and pollution prevention and
management, (4) community health and safety, (5) land acquisition and restrictions
on land use and involuntary resettlement, (6) biodiversity conservation and
sustainable management of living natural resources, (7) indigenous peoples/sub-
Saharan African historically underserved traditional local communities, (8) cultural
heritage, (9) financial intermediaries, and (10) stakeholder engagement and
information disclosure).
156. See JOEL OESTREICH, POWER AND PRINCIPLE: HUMAN RIGHTS
PROGRAMMING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 80–81 (2007) (explaining that
through a change in management structure and the model of accepting development
projects, the Bank has been able to pursue projects that meet its mission of
development while also promoting human rights goals).
157. Franklin Berman et al., Final Report of the International Law Association
Berlin Conference (2004): Accountability of International Law Organizations, 1
INT’LORGS. L. REV. 221, 225–26 (2004).
158. See Press Release, United Nations Gen. Assembly, Preventative Measures,
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remedies constitutes the closing element of the model in both its legal
and policy dimensions.159 First, this principle involves providing a
forum to investigate, punish, and redress human rights violations in
order to provide substantive justice in development finance.160 Second,
providing access to remedies does not mean that all allegations result
from real abuses or that all complaints are bona fide.161 As
expectations for adjudication of human rights are expanding, this
analysis explores remedies to secure substantive justice at the national
and international levels.
This section focuses on quasi-judicial and judicial remedies in the
development finance context that are available to those who are
harmed in the course of IFIs’ projects. The former rely on Internal
Accountability Mechanisms, which are quasi-judicial bodies internal
to IFIs but independent. Even if this mechanism is accessible by
individuals, it lacks full effectiveness.162 Indeed, it relies on
Accessible Remedies Required to Address Myriad Human Rights Violations,
Experts Tell Third Committee During Interactive Dialogues, U.N. Press Release
GA/SHC/4206 (Oct. 17, 2017) (explaining that effective remedies are necessary to
prevent and resolve human rights abuses that impede achievement of the Sustainable
Development Goals, equitable distribution of development benefits, and global
stability).
159. See Access to Remedy, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages
/AccessToRememdy.aspx (last visited June 21, 2020) (describing how access to
remedies is central throughout the Guiding Principles for effective implementation
of the Protect, Respect, and Remedy framework).
160. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 8 (explaining
that countries must provide forums for the prevention, investigation, punishment,
and redress of human rights abuses in their jurisdictions through policies, legislation,
regulations, and adjudication).
161. John Gerard Ruggie, Protect, Respect, and Remedy: The UN Framework for
Business and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: SIX
DECADES AFTER THE UDHR AND BEYOND 519, 534 (Mashood A. Baderin &
Manisuli Ssenyonjo eds., 2010).
162. See Celine Tan,Mandating Rights and Limiting Mission Creep: Holding the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund Accountable for Human Rights
Violations, 2 HUM. RTS. & INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 79, 92, 94–97, 101 (2008)
(explaining that the asymmetrical structure of decision-making, the lack of
legitimacy in creating organizational structures, and the lack of transparency in the
implementation of processes limits the effectiveness of internal accountability
mechanisms because the structures grant too much discretionary power that
undermines true accountability).
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organizations’ internal rules and is not always accessible by social
communities.163 The latter solution, judicial remedies, is needed to
mitigate IFIs’ immunity before national courts.164 These systems need
163. See David Hunter & Lori Udall, The World Bank’s New Inspection Panel:
Will It Increase the Bank’s Accountability?, CTR. INT’L ENVTL. LAW,
https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/1994/04/issue1.pdf (last visited July 4,
2020) (describing how the internal operations and structure give too much
discretionary power to the Executive Directors before allowing public access, which
undermines the goals of transparency and accessibility); see also Enrique R.
Carrasco, Wesley Carrington & HeeJin Lee, Governance and Accountability: The
Regional Development Banks, 27 BOS. U. INT’L L.J. 1, 5, 43–46, 51 (2009)
(providing an examples of how internal accountability mechanisms are limited by
potential conflicts of interest when members of the organization are also on the body
overseeing complaints and investigations, which could subvert the purpose of the
mechanism); IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN
PRACTICE 205, 207–09 (2nd ed. 2001) (explaining that access to remedies can be
limited by restrictive conditions of parties eligible to bring claims and by allotting
discretionary judgment to executive staff to grant investigations on complaints by
parties otherwise not eligible); Tan, supra note 162, at 88–89, 101–02 (explaining
that even with sustainable internal accountability mechanisms, they are not effective
without enforcement, and the role of the enforcement bodies is generally limited to
a supervisory one); August Reinisch, The Immunity of International Organizations
and the Jurisdiction of Their Administrative Tribunals, 7 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 285,
291–92 (2008) [hereinafter Reinisch, Immunity of International Organizations] )
(pointing out the need for “reasonable alternative means” as expressed by the
European Court of Human Rights in its 1999 Waite and Kennedy judgment on
jurisdictional immunity of international organizations); Suzuki Eisuke, The Review
and Repudiation of Judgments of International Administrative Tribunals, 7 ASIAN
Y.B. OF INT’L L. 175, 205–07 (199) (explaining the immunities and privileges of
international organizations and their agents as a “functional protection under
international law” while being mainly subject to the organization’s own internal
laws); Richard J. Oparil, Immunity of International Organizations in United States
Courts: Absolute or Restrictive?, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 696–97 (1991)
(explaining how, because international courts have found international organizations
immune from suits pertaining to employee relationships as well as internal
administrative issues, international organizations enjoy broad immunity from courts,
making accountability a mainly internal process); Steven C. Nelson, Alternatives to
Litigation of International Disputes, 23 INT’LLAW. 187, 191 (1989) (explaining that
the involvement of governments in the activities of international organizations
provides another level of immunity from other measures of accountability).
164. See Eisuke Suzuki, Responsibility of International Financial Institutions
Under International Law, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 100 (Daniel D. Bradlow & David B. Hunter eds., 2010)
(reinforcing that administrative tribunals need a statutory grant to adjudicate tort
claims against IFIs).
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to be implemented ratione materiae and ratione personae,165
respectively, in order to have non-state parties’ claims heard whenever
human rights obligations are at stake.166 This solution needs to be
tailored on the basis of the principles of immunity and the
responsibilities of international organizations because IFIs are
shielded before domestic jurisdictions.167
165. Because of the nature of the relevant subject matter (ratione materiae), and
the IOs’ position in international law (ratione personae), access to remedy must be
assessed through the lens of the principles of immunities and responsibilities.
166. Id. at 100.
167. See Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, Attribution of Conduct After the Advisory
Opinion on the Global Mechanism, in RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR IAN BROWNLIE 275, 280 (Maurizio
Ragazzi ed., 2013) (underscoring the legal immunity of international organizations
from actions by their specialized entities as long as that separate entity holds its own
“legal personality” in either international or domestic jurisdictions); see also Daniel
D. Bradlow, Private Complainants and International Organizations: A Comparative
Study of the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in International Financial
Institutions, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 403, 405–06 (2005) (describing the ways in which
organizational immunity through lack of domestic jurisdiction and restricted
international jurisdiction limits the parties that can hold an international organization
responsible, which has left impacted nonstate parties that do not have a contractual
relationship with the organization without recourse); Eisuke Suzuki & Suresh
Nanwani, Responsibility of International Organizations: The Accountability
Mechanisms of Multilateral Development Banks, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 177, 179–80
(2005) (explaining how international law surrounding the legal privileges and
immunities for international organizations must change as their role in international
activities changes to impact more nonstate parties); Hunter & Udall, supra note 163
(advocating that the World Bank’s current internal efforts at accountability have
failed due to lack of transparency and lack of involvement by other actors); Dana
Clark, Understanding the World Bank Inspection Panel, in DEMANDING
ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL-SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION
PANEL 1, 1–2 (Dana Clark, Jonathan Fox & Kay Treakle eds., 2003) (pointing out
that previous criticisms of the World Bank’s transparency and accountability
measures relied on the need for internal responsibility for effective implementation
of social policies); Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown, Introduction, in THE
STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND GRASSROOTS
MOVEMENTS 12–13 (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998) (describing
how internal effort measures with only discretionary mechanisms for accountability
fail to create effective and accessible channels for change, especially when, under
international law, developments banks can only be held accountable by member
states); Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Claims Against International Organizations: Quis
Custodiet Ipsos Custodies, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 131, 163–65 (1981)
(providing that the doctrine of organizational immunity in national courts, while
needed to protect organization from improper influence in their work, is not absolute
and is dependent on various factors); Bennett Freeman, Business and Human Rights:
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A. LEGALRESPONSIBILITY OF IFIS
The operations and decisions of IFIs may cause violations of
international human rights law as a direct consequence of the
implementation of programs and operations within client countries.168
International accountability arises as a result of this “adverse
impact.”169 In other words, a level of accountability applies to all direct
and indirect contacts of IFIs with affected individuals in their
projects.170 Since individuals cannot pledge their rights institutionally
as states do,171 international law leaves the door open to debate.
The phenomenon of legal responsibility must be analyzed as a
balance between institutional prerogatives and respect for the
principles of due process.172 Under the fundamental principle of due
Advancing the Agenda, Report on Wilton Park Conference WP05/33 4–5 (Oct. 11,
2005) (urging governments to use their power in their dealings with IFIs to prioritize
human rights by ensuring safeguards in the negotiation, planning, and execution of
development projects.); Jonathan Fox, Introduction: Framing the Inspection Panel,
in DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL-SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK
INSPECTION PANEL xiii (Dana Clark, Jonathan Fox & Kay Treakle eds., 2003)
(“Before the contested construction of the World Bank’s minimum social and
environmental standards and the creation of the Inspection Panel, the World Bank
was a ‘lawless institution,’ insofar as it was insulated from any legal responsibility
to people directly affected by its actions.”).
168. See Tan, supra note 162, at 86 (providing examples of how projects from
IFIs can violate international human rights law, such as the creation of
environmental damage through infrastructure projects and the infringement on the
political rights of citizens through loan conditions).
169. See Bradlow, supra note 1, at 1–3 (describing how the implementation of the
World Bank Inspection Panel led to the ability of harmed parties to hold IFIs
accountable).
170. SeeArsanjani, supra note 166, at 134–35 (identifying the various parties who
might be harmed by an international organization’s activities, including citizens,
governments, other organizations, and the organization’s own members).
171. See Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest
Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2292 (1991) (explaining that, under the traditional
assumption that international law exclusively regulates relations between nations, an
individual cannot bring a claim under international law; rather, it must be done by
the individual’s nation on his behalf).
172. See David B. Hunter, International Law and Public Participation in Policy
Making at the International Financial Institutions, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 216, 219–220 (Daniel D. Bradlow &
David B. Hunter eds., 2010) (explaining that the right to due process is established
within international law, and that even when there is no access to judicial review,
the right to due process must be protected and guaranteed through the establishment
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process, everyone is entitled to have his or her claim adjudicated by a
fair and impartial judge.173 This principle, which underpins the
substantive right to a remedy, is expressly set out in Article 10 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; it reflects a
general customary norm.174 Nonetheless, since IFIs are protected by
the principle of immunity, due process could elude people harmed by
IFI-financed projects.175 Therefore, it is necessary to find an adequate
alternative venue in which claimants can seek fair remedial actions in
order to fulfill substantive justice in development finance operations.
From the beginning, international organizations were created as
supra-national subjects of international law that were intended to
enjoy legal personality.176 This view has been enshrined in
international jurisprudence since a 1949 opinion of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).177 Moreover, with regard to the rights and
obligations of IFIs, the ICJ, in its advisory opinion pertaining to the
WHO and Egypt in 1951,178 specified that international organizations
are bound by all duties deriving from general rules of international law
under their constituent treaties and internal rules, or under the
of an institutional framework by international organizations themselves).
173. See Steven Herz, Rethinking International Financial Institution Immunity, in
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 146, 149–50
(Daniel D. Bradlow & David B. Hunter eds., 2010) (“[C]onsensus is emerging that
under international human rights law one has a fundamental right to have their legal
claims adjudicated by an independent and impartial court or tribunal.”); Arsanjani,
supra note 166, at 174–75 (reasoning that now that the right to due process is
included in the Universal Declaration for Human Rights, international organizations
must implement procedures to comply with this principle of due process). See
generally G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10
(Dec. 10, 1948) (stating the right of people to fair and impartial hearings before
independent and impartial tribunals).
174. Reinisch, Immunity of International Organizations, supra note 163, at 150.
175. See Herz, supra note 172, at 149–50 (discussing the Bank’s response of
limiting responsibility with regard to obligations under ILO conventions).
176. See James E. Hickey, Jr., The Source of International Legal Personality in
the 21st Century, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 1, 3, 5 (1997) (defining legal
personality for international organizations).
177. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr. 11) (outlining the necessity for
international personality for international organizations).
178. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and
Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73 (Oct. 10, 1962).
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international agreements to which they are parties.179 In other words,
not only does the principle of specialty divide international
organizations by their functions and purposes, it also preserves the
autonomy and effectiveness of each organization.180
This system has given rise to concerns about protecting those
interests not included in an organization’s charter.181 With regard to
IFIs, which are economic subjects with no political mandate,182 the
system described here leaves a legal vacuum such that obligations
protected under international human rights law cannot be enforced.
Therefore, even though IFIs enjoy legal personality under
international law, they claim independence from being subject to
liability under international law.
The rationale for this model dates back to the historic period in
which the Bretton Woods institutions – namely the IMF and the
World Bank – were created.183 These institutions were conceived in a
purely state-centric international community in which they could be
held accountable only to their member states through their internal
governance mechanisms.184 Jurisdictional immunity was conceived as
a way to preserve the organizations’ prerogatives in the face of third-
party influences.185
The evolution of the international legal system resulted in a historic
change in the conception of the international community.186 The
179. See Gianviti, supra note 123, at 113 (explaining the duties of parties to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
180. Suzuki, supra note 163, at 96–97 (“The principle of speciality supports
organizational effectiveness.”).
181. See Bradlow, supra note 1, at 233 (discussing IFIs’ interpretations of
charters).
182. See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 74, art. 4, § 10 (describing that
political activity is prohibited by the Bank and its officers).
183. See Tan, supra note 162, at 80, 115 (stating the Bretton Woods institutions
were conceived in 1944).
184. See Bradlow, supra note 1, at 208, 212 (critiquing the application of state-
centric perspective of environmental and social standard development to IFIs’
standard development process); Bradlow, Private Complaints and International
Organizations, supra note 166, at 405 (explaining how international organizations
are held accountable to their member states).
185. See Brilmayer, supra note 170, at 2292 (contemplating how the structure of
human rights claim remedies only benefit the state and not the individual).
186. See Schacter, supra note 103, at 10–13 (outlining changes in the international
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classic international community was conceived as a state-based legal
entity, but the modern international community saw the rise of new
actors, as individuals, along with the reinforcement of global concerns
about legal protection of common goods and human rights.187
Especially in the aftermath of World War II, protection of individuals
emerged in the international legal framework as a result of the
consolidation of democratic values and human dignity worldwide.188
However, despite the evolution of the international legal system, IFIs
retained their original architecture, which lacked an effective
mechanism for securing substantive justice.189
For this reason, the independence of IFIs in the implementation of
their activities seems to have grown beyond the limits that originally
inspired the drafters.190 On the verge of sustainability, the increasing
impact of international finance on human rights obligations required
evolution toward a more programmatic approach to access to
remedies.191
To analyze access to remedies in development finance, it is
necessary to take into account the independence and effectiveness of
IFIs vis-à-vis the values protected by individual rights and due
process. This analysis will identify a forum competent to grant judicial
review as well as alternative relief to affected parties, with a focus on
the Internal Accountability Mechanisms of IFIs and available judicial
remedies.
B. INTERNALACCOUNTABILITYMECHANISMS IN THE
legal system).
187. See id. at 10–13 (discussing the influence of social advocacy non-
governmental bodies on developments on international law).
188. See August Reinisch, The Changing International Legal Framework for
Dealing with Non-State Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 38
(Philip Alston ed., 2005) (describing the change in perception of individuals in the
international legal landscape).
189. See Hunter, Civil Society Networks and the Development of Environmental
Standards at International Financial Institutions, supra note 123, at 468 (identifying
a critique of IFC’s failure to incorporate appropriate human rights standards).
190. Tan, supra note 162, at 193–94 (“[e]xpand the scope of their operations
beyond what their initial founders envisaged”).
191. See McBeth, supra note 91, at 1101, 1116, 1118 (noting the progress in the
interpretation of the World Bank mandate and how the new interpretation demands
a new approach to remedies).
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DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CONTEXT
This section explores the quasi-judicial mechanisms available at the
international level to redress human rights violations in the
development finance context. International organizations’ duty to
provide access to a remedy for violations can be complied with
through judicial or quasi-judicial channels.192 In the field of human
rights, this fact has been enshrined in the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights mainly through two decisions, Beer
and Reagan v. Germany andWaite and Kennedy v. Germany.193When
judicial solutions are not available, claimants should have access to
reasonable alternative means to effectively protect their rights.194
In the development finance context, IFIs have established Internal
Accountability Mechanisms (IAMs) to promote accountability
through an independent authority.195 They are quasi-judicial bodies
that provide a forum for people claiming to have been adversely
affected in development finance operations.196 Based on the archetype
of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel197 established in 1993, IAMs are
internal bodies within IFIs that were created as a mechanism to
allocate responsibility and provide a legal remedy for complainants’
harm.198
192. See Reinisch, Immunity of International Organizations, supra note 163, at
286 (noting that remedies must be provided through judicial or quasi-judicial
channels due to immunity).
193. See Beer and Reagan v. Germany, App. No. 28934/95, 1 (Feb. 18, 1999);
Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R 393 (holding that there are
other options for applicants to obtain remedies for labor disputes besides judicial
channels).
194. See Reinisch, Immunity of International Organizations, supra note 163, at
286, 292 (discussing the implications of the holdings of Beer and Regan and Waite
and Kennedy).
195. See August Reinisch & Jakob Wurm, International Financial Institutions
Before National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 103, 111 (Daniel D. Bradlow & David B. Hunter eds., 2010)
(noting that staff members usually need to pursue employment claims through
internal mechanisms due to immunity clauses); Bradlow, supra note 1, at 393
(exploring how IAMs can strengthen accountability).
196. Reinisch, Immunity of International Organizations, supra note 163, at 286.
197. Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Development Res. 93-10, at 1 (Sept. 22,
1993).
198. See Bradlow, supra note 1, at 232 (defining IAMs with respect to IFIs).
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These mechanisms operate in compliance with internal policies and
procedures of the organization that authorize them to issue decisions
but not reparations.199 In other words, in most cases, IAMs are fact-
finding bodies with no authority to prevent or end human rights
abuses.200 Whether this is an effective mechanism for providing a
remedy depends on whether the institution voluntarily complies with
IAMs’ decisions.201 For instance, the World Bank’s Inspection Panel
is tasked to report to the Board of Executive Directors, which
ultimately holds decision-making power.202 Any violation falling
outside internal constitutions and agreements is not subject to this
mechanism, thus undermining the panel’s effectiveness.203
In addition to the new ESF of the World Bank, very few IFIs make
explicit commitments to upholding and protecting human rights.204
The institutions that do, such as the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation and the European Investment Bank, fail to provide
guidance notes or ensure that enforceable policies are integrated into
project design.205 Therefore, though IAMs can be considered an
199. See Tan, supra note 162, at 102 (highlighting that the purpose of
recommendations from the Inspection Panel is “to review Bank procedures in light
of non-compliance rather than to provide for reparations for harm done”).
200. See id. at 106 (discussing the shift of responsibility for policing human rights
to IFIs).
201. See Alston, supra note 76, at 12 (noting that there is a difference between
adopting human rights policy and enforcing said policy).
202. Shihata, supra note 163, at 276 (“[t]he Board would “always retain [the] final
decision-making power” . . . The Panel shall submit its report to the Executive
Directors and the President.”).
203. See Bradlow, supra note 1, at 29 (discussing limitations of inspection
panels).
204. See Alston, supra note 76, at 10–11 (noting that the current safeguards put
forth by the World Bank contain no explicit human rights policies).
205. VIOLET BENNEKER ET AL., CIEL, GLASS HALF FULL: THE STATE OF
ACCOUNTABILITY IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE § 3.6 (2016),
https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/IAM_DEF_WEB.pdf (assessing
the necessity to have rights-compatible standards to measure IFIs’ performance in
order to have rights-compatible outcomes of complaints processes); see also David
B. Hunter, International Law and Public Participation in Policy Making at the
International Financial Institutions, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 216, 231 (Daniel D. Bradlow & David B. Hunter eds.,
2010) (assessing the discretion of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in
waiving the applicability of the environmental and social policies on specific
projects).
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important innovation, they may be ineffective in providing due
process to affected people in IFI-financed operations.206 People filing
complaints have been the targets of threats, intimidation, and criminal
charges at a domestic level, frustrating access to and the effectiveness
of IAMs.207Private parties seeking remedies for breach of international
obligations with respect to human rights should still advocate
indirectly through their governments or seek a remedy before
domestic courts if their right of due process is frustrated on an
international level.208 This omission makes reform of the system
necessary to provide effective remedies that satisfy the due process
principle.209 With this regard, the enhanced scope of the new ESF
reflect a positive step toward a broader empowerment of the
Inspection Panel to hold the Bank accountable for social and
environmental harm, while protecting a wider group of people.210
In the twenty-seven years of work since the institution of the
Inspection Panel, IAMs have functioned as a sword of Damocles in
IFIs’ operations, producing important advances.211 First, they have
206. See B.S. Chimni, IFIs and International Law: A Third World Perspective, in
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS & INTERNATIONAL LAW 31, 45–47
(Daniel D. Bradlow & David B. Hunter eds., 2010) (describing the limitations of
states in enforcing human rights policies).
207. VIOLET BENNEKER ET AL., CIEL, GLASS HALF FULL: THE STATE OF
ACCOUNTABILITY IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE § 3.6 (2016),
https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/IAM_DEF_WEB.pdf (“A recent
report by Human Rights Watch documents the reprisals, threats, intimidation and
baseless criminal charges faced by some complainants who have sought to use the
Inspection Panel and the CAO.”).
208. See Suzuki & Nanwani, supra note 166, at 214 (discussing panels
requirement to proceed with claims through management or local remedies before
taking to the international level).
209. See Hunter, Civil Society Networks and the Development of Environmental
Standards at International Financial Institutions, supra note 123, at 460 (illustrating
the World Bank’s hesitation to add human rights language to its policies).
210. In order to hold the Bank accountable for environmental and social harm, the
Inspection Panel must be able to establish a link between the Bank’s duties and its
requirements. As the new ESF expanded the thematic coverage of the internal
safeguards, the Inspection Panel can hold the Bank accountable for a wider array of
cases and with regard to a wider group of people. See Cristina Passoni, Ariel
Rosenbaum, Eleanor Vermunt, Empowering the Inspection Panel: The Impact of the
World Bank’s New Environmental and Social Safeguards, 49 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 921, 940 (2017).
211. See Peter L. Lallas, Citizen-Driven Accountability: The Inspection Panel and
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secured broader participation and accountability for better
development outcomes.212 Second, they have furthered a progressive
agenda for human rights protection, which mirrors the new ESF
toolkit, allowing the World Bank’s Inspection Panel to offer redress
for a broader array of rights.213
C. JUDICIALMECHANISMS
Whenever IAMs are unavailable or ineffective, affected people in
IFI-financed projects may seek remedies through domestic courts.215
The analysis of access to a remedy through judicial mechanisms
involves policy and legal considerations; there is a delicate balance
between IFIs’ immunities and responsibilities under international
law.216
The immunity of IFIs is the result of the need for international
organizations to have their functional necessity secured in order to
safeguard their independence and effectiveness.214 This protects them
against undue external interference or political judgments as they
pursue their objectives.215 Analyzing international organizations’
privileges and immunities at the domestic level sheds light on the level
of accountability these institutions have before domestic courts. The
experience of the United States is a relevant case study, as it hosts in
its territory the headquarters of several multilateral organizations,
Other Independent Accountability Mechanisms, 107 ASIL PROC. 308, 312 (2013)
(outlining important advances made by the Panel).
212. See id. at 313–14 (identifying core missions of citizen-led IAMs).
213. See Cristina Passoni, Ariel Rosenbaum, Eleanor Vermunt, Empowering the
Inspection Panel: The Impact of the World Bank’s New Environmental and Social
Safeguards, 49 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 921, 926 (2017).
215 See August Reinisch & Jakob Wurm, International Financial Institutions Before
National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 103, 104-07 (Daniel D. Bradlow & David B. Hunter eds., 2010)
216 See José E. Alvarez, International Organisations and the Rule of Law, 14 N. Z. J.
PUB. AND INT’L L. 3, 5 (2016); see generally AUGUST REINISCH, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS (2000) (analyzing empirical data
regarding legal interpretation techniques and judicial decisions on international
organizations’ immunities).
214. BB/SC ADD SOURCE
215. See Josef L. Kunz, Privileges and Immunities of International
Organizations, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 828, 836 (1947).
2020] IFIS&THEIRHR SILENT AGENDA 95
some of which are IFIs;216 additionally, U.S. domestic courts have
influence internationally.217
In the U.S. legal system, the International Organizations Immunities
Act of 1945 (IOIA) defines international organizations’ immunities
from suit before U.S. courts to be as broad as those protections enjoyed
by foreign governments.218 Therefore, when the Act was passed
foreign governments generally had absolute immunity, this protection
extended to international organizations.219Over time, exceptions to the
principle of absolute immunity of foreign sovereigns have been
introduced in the international community,220 including in the United
States, which enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA).221 This law allows domestic courts to hear some categories of
lawsuits—those that relate to foreign governments’ actions that are not
quintessentially sovereign in nature.222 However, the U.S. domestic
legal system did not explicitly clarify whether FSIA provisions
regarding “restrictive immunity” applied to international
216. The Washington-based IFIs are the World Bank Group, the International
Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank.
217. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1854–55 (1998) (demonstrating the transition of the Ninth
Circuit’s application of an interest-balancing test into an internationally-used
standard for determining whether a nation’s exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction is
reasonable).
218. See 22 U.S.C. § 288 (defining international organization as a “public
international organization in which the United States participates pursuant to any
treaty or under the authority of any Act of Congress authorizing such participation
or making an appropriation for such participation, and which shall have been
designated by the President through appropriate Executive order as being entitled to
enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities”).
219. See, e.g., Kunz, supra note 218, at 830–32 (illustrating the increase in grants
of diplomatic privileges to European and South American organizations in the early
20th century); Aaron I. Young, Deconstructing International Organization
Immunity, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 311, 314 (2013); Gordon H. Glenn et al., Immunities
of International Organizations, 22 VA. J. INT’L L. 247, 251–52 (1982) (discussing
legislative intent under the International Organizations Immunities Act).
220. Young, supra note 222, at 339 (explaining that the restrictive immunity will
be unnecessary for international organizations that are commercial in nature).
221. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2020).
222. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360–61 (1992) (applying the
absolute theory of foreign sovereign immunity to find that Saudi Arabia’s exercise
of police powers against Americans was a quintessentially sovereign act and thus
unreviewable under the FSIA).
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organizations as well.223 Based on the jurisprudential application of
domestic statues, U.S. courts generated an asymmetry between foreign
sovereigns’ immunities and international organizations’ immunities—
in most cases, the latter retained the benefit of absolute protection.224
Thus, through a literal interpretation of the statute, judicial
hermeneutics set the standards of protection of international
organizations higher than those for sovereign governments.225
Case law demonstrates how IOs’ functional necessity has been
expanded beyond its literal scope, resulting in absolute immunity de
facto. For instance, in Loughran v. United States, the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (D.C. Circuit) upheld the
absolute immunity of the IMF from all judicial process in the United
States.226
Similarly, in 1980 in Broadbent v. Organization of American States,
theD.C. Circuit affirmed dismissal of a suit against the Organizationof
AmericanStatesby former employees.227 The court stated, on the basis
of a literal and historical interpretation of the statute, that the FSIA did
not explicitly amend the IOIA. Indeed, the plain text of the IOIA, along
with its legislative history, gives to the Executive Branch, and
particularly to the U.S. President, the responsibility for limiting
immunities of IOs.228 As a result, it was held that the concept of
restrictive immunity of foreign states did not apply to IOs.229 The D.C.
223. See Young, supra note 222, at 320; see also Joseph W. Dellapenna, Refining
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 9 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL.
57, 114 (2001) (explaining that the legislative history of the IOIA does not clarify
whether Congress intended for the statute to confer immunity as foreign
governments enjoyed it in 1945 or as it has evolved in the decades since).
224. See Young, supra note 223, at 321–351 (describing a circuit split in whether
international organizations carried the same immunities as foreign sovereigns).
225. See Steven Herz, International Organizations in U.S. Courts: Reconsidering
the Anachronism of Absolute Immunity, 31 SUFFOLKTRANSNAT’LL. REV. 471, 495–
97 (analyzing the jurisprudential practice of granting absolute immunity to IOs based
on a static interpretation of the IOIA).
226. See Loughran v. United States, 317 F.2d 896, 898–99 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
(recognizing that the Fund shall enjoy immunity unless it explicitly waives such
immunity).
227. Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 28, 33–36 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
228. Id. at 31–32.
229. Id. at 32 n.20 (“[International] organizations do not regularly engage in
commercial activities.”).
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Circuit arrived at analogous conclusions inMendaro v. World Bank in
1983; it did not apply the FSIA regulation in a case concerning internal
administrative affairs of organizations.230
As a result of such broad immunity, the only way for an IFI to be
brought before a domestic court and have a judgment on the merits
entered against it is for there to be a waiver of the organization’s
immunity.231 That is what happened in Osseiran v. International
Finance Corp. and Concesionaria DHM v. International Finance
Corp.232Beyond the U.S. scenario, it is notable that an exception to the
broad immunity granted by IFIs is represented by the European
Investment Bank, whose founding documents do not preclude the
possibility of it being sued before national courts or before the
European Court of Justice.233
Independence from domestic courts is the result of the
implementation of domestic law.234 Put differently, states agree to
IFIs’ immunity through a variety of instruments – constituent
agreements, headquarters agreements, or customary international
law.235 Unlike those of other international organizations, most IFIs’
constituent agreements provide specific limitations for immunity, in
light of the economic mandate of these institutions.236 The “borrowers’
exception” allows the organizations to be sued before domestic courts
230. SeeMendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
231. See id. at 20–21 (noting that the FSIA confers immunity “except to the extent
that [IOs] expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by
the terms of any contract”) (emphasis added).
232. See, e.g., Osserain v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 139, 143–46 (D.D.C.
2007); Concesionaria DHM v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 307 F. Supp. 2d. 553, 557–58
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
233. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 28, Jul. 6, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 264 [hereinafter TFEU].
234. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526 (2008) (demonstrating
independence of domestic courts by requiring that a non-self-executing treaty may
only have domestic effect if it was passed through Congress and signed by the
President).
235. SeeKristina Daugirdas,How andWhy International Law Binds International
Organizations, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 325, 332 n.34, 359–60.
236. See Yohei Okada, The Immunity of International Organizations Before and
After Jam v. IFC: Is the Functional Necessity Rationale Still Relevant?, 72
QUESTIONS OF INT’L L. 29, 34–35 (2020) (comparing immunity provisions in the
U.N. Charter with the World Bank and IFC’s Articles of Agreement).
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by private parties in all those cases in which they act like borrowers.237
This system is aimed at respecting the creditworthiness of
international capital markets, as it was specified by the D.C. Circuit in
Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v. Inter-American Development Bank
and Atlantic Tele-Network v. Inter-American Development Bank. 238
Given the lack of clarity in the U.S. legal system regarding
privileges and immunities, in some circumstances U.S. courts have
interpreted IOs’ privileges and immunities in the light of the FSIA.239
Specifically, in Rendall-Seranza v. Nassim, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia concluded that the IOIA should be
read in light of the FSIA, applying new standards in foreign
sovereigns’ immunity. 240 The court found that “[a]lthough Congress
enacted the IOIA in 1945, when foreign governments enjoyed broad
immunity, presumably it knew how to revise the IOIA when the
immunity of foreign governments was diminished with the passage of
the FSIA.”241
In Atkinson v. Inter-American Development Bank, the D.C. Circuit
found that IOs are immune from suit and any form of judicial process
and that Congress provided no guidance on whether Congress
intended to incorporate subsequent changes applicable to foreign
sovereigns into interpretation of the IOIA. 242 The court pointed out
that foreign sovereign immunity falls under political action and,
particularly, the U.S. President has authority over IOs’ privileges,
including the possibility of limiting their scope in commercial
activities.243
237. See Reinisch & Wurm, supra note 195, at 123–24 (discussing cases that
narrowly interpreted the borrowing exception to the immunity).
238. See, e.g., Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 382 F.2d
455, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Atl. Tele-Network v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 251 F. Supp.
2d 126, 128, 130–32 (D.D.C. 2003); Scimet v. African Development Bank, Court of
First Instance of Brussels, 14 Feb. 1997, 128 I.L.R. 582.
239. See, e.g., Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 932 F. Supp 19, 23 (D.D.C. 1996)
240. Id. at 19, 21, 23–24.
241. Id. at 24.
242. See Atkinson v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(stating that the IOIS provided no explicit guidance on whether Congress intended
to incorporate the IOIA subsequent changes to the law governing the immunity of
foreign sovereigns so the power rests with the president).
243. Id. at 1341.
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More recently, in 2010 in OSS Nokalva v. European Space Agency,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit progressively evolved
toward a restrictive interpretation that IOs’ immunities should be
adapted to those of foreign sovereigns. 244 The court applied the canon
of statutory interpretation that a statute generally adopts the legal
standards in place at the time the law is enacted, which include
subsequent amendments and modifications of the statute.245 The court
found that “nothing in the statutory language or legislative history
suggests that the IOIA provision delegating authority to the President
to alter the immunity of international organizations precludes
incorporation of any subsequent change to the immunity of foreign
sovereigns.”246
The legal framework pictured hitherto leaves a gap in the
international legal system – obligations arising from international law
that are not covered by a convention signed by the organization or
provided for in a contract under which the IFI is a borrower are not
legally protected or regulated.247 As a result, individuals whose
fundamental rights are affected by development finance operations
have no remedy before domestic courts.248Because human rights lie at
the heart of the U.N. architecture,249 such people should constitute the
244. See OSS Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 764 (3d
Cir. 2010) (concluding that ESA is not entitled to immunity as it stood for foreign
sovereigns in 1945).
245. See id. at 763 (describing the court’s persuasion from the well-established
rules of statutory interpretation through which it is understood that congress intended
the IOIA to incorporate subsequent changes to the immunity enjoyed by foreign
governments).
246. Id. (citing the Senate committee report described in Atkinson).
247. SeeMichael Singer, Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations:
Human Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 56, 65 (1995)
(providing that an international organization has no right to self-determination, but
does have a right conterminous with obligations as set out in its constituent
instrument).
248. See id. at 93–94 (stating that the court must first satisfy itself that the plaintiff
has not alleged a violation of international law, only then may it proceed with the
functional necessity doctrine which shields international organizations from judicial
scrutiny); McInerney-Lankford & Sano, supra note 93, at 3–4 (discussing the
incorporation of human rights considerations).
249. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3 (“The Purposes of the United Nations are: . . . to
achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic,
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect
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“most compelling reason” for which IFIs should be held responsible
for their violations.250
In the development finance legal debate, recourse to domestic
courts has been discouraged in order to avoid exposing IFIs to a
multiplicity of different legal systems around the world and an
explosion of lawsuits.251 Nonetheless, as the international agenda
evolved new standards of protection, especially in the field of
environmental torts and human rights violation, the topic of IOs’
immunity was recently scrutinized by the U.S. Supreme Court.252
In 2015, communities affected by a coal-fired power plant – the
Tata Mundra project, financed by the IFC of the WBG – filed suit in
federal court in Washington, D.C.253 In March 2016, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia decided that the IFC, since
it was under the WBG umbrella, was entitled to absolute immunity.
Therefore, it dismissed the case,254 reaffirming that there is an absolute
shield for international organizations pursuant to the 1998 case
Atkinson v. Inter-American Development Bank.255 The case was
appealed, and in June 2017 the D.C. Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the
IFC could not be sued.256Notwithstanding the unanimous decision of
the panel, in a concurring opinion, Judge Cornelia Pillard suggested
that the D.C. Circuit reconsider the Atkinson for private claimants.257
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion.”).
250. Herz, supra note 175, at 162.
251. See Reinisch & Wurm, supra note 163, at 123 (explaining IFIs do not have
broad jurisdictional immunity).
252. See Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 759 (finding that the immunity international
organizations as foreign governments enjoy under FSIA is not absolute).
253. See generally Tata Mundra Coal Power Plant, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L, https://
earthrights.org/tata-mundra - coal -power-plant/ (last visited June 20, 2020)
(explaining the procedural history and the claim brought against the IFC).
254. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 759 (granting the motion to dismiss).
255. Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1339–40 (stating IOs enjoy absolute immunity).
256. Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (affirming the
lower courts ruling); see Indian Fishing Community Asks U.S. Supreme Court to
Hear Case Challenging World Bank Group Immunity, EARTH RIGHTS INT’L,
earthrights.org/ media/Indian-fishing-community -asks-u-s-supreme-court-hear-
case -challenging-world-bank-group-immunity/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2020) (stating
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that IFC could not be sued).
257. Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 759.
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This system would pierce the absolute immunity veil of IFIs and
would establish public accountability of IFIs under international
human rights law.
V. CONCLUSION
The current debate on development finance and human rights has
evolved through the 2030 agenda for sustainable development, which
has mainstreamed sustainability and inclusion in IFIs’ policies and
projects.258 Since the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions in
1944, the architecture of IFIs has evolved tremendously.259 They
constitute one of the major channels for combining markets’ short-
term needs and policies’ long-term objectives.260 Stalled for years in
legal formalism and political misalignments, the human rights agenda
has silently evolved in development finance, shaping operations of
IFIs despite the “political prohibition” that says they should not be
involved with politically sensitive topics such as human rights at a
domestic level.261
This Article proposes a conceptual and policy framework to bridge
the gap between development finance and human rights,
demonstrating that human rights lie at the heart of the global challenge
of IFIs moving toward sustainable development. The analysis takes
into account governance needs of both IFIs and borrowing countries
258. See HRBA, supra note 92, at 1–2 (explaining that programs of development
cooperation contribute to the development of the capacities of duty-bearers);
McInerney-Lankford & Sano, supra note 93, at 3–4 (identifying principles that are
of importance); Roadmap, supra note 97, at 20–39 (discussing the 2030 agenda and
what it calls for concerning IFI’s).
259. See Trimble, supra note 103, at 1969 (tracking the change created by the
Bretton Woods Institute and World Trade Organization).
260. See Cissé, supra note 111, at 72–73 (discussing the Bank’s developments to
assist in the promotion of social, economic, and cultural rights, and their increasing
willingness to address human rights issues); Uzan, supra note 1, at 418–19 (debating
medium-term initiatives); Watt, supra note 111, at 43; Kirgis, supra note 83, at 892
(stating that human rights have always been the basic goal of the UN).
261. See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 74, art. 4, § 10 (affirming the
Bank is not to interfere with the political affairs of any member and only economic
considerations should be relevant to the Bank’s decisions); OHCHR, supra note 75
(stating the World Bank is a human rights-free zone); Alston, supra note 76, at 2, 4
(articulating that the Bank’s Articles of Agreement would normally prohibit it from
promoting political rights).
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while preserving international legal prerogatives in order to examine
the current status of human rights in development finance operations
and pave the way forward.
Applying the Protect, Respect and Remedymodel in a development
finance context aims to encourage investments in a human rights-
sensitive framework, correcting imbalances in this field. Development
finance operations touch an array of subjects and stakeholders, from
governments to business actors, from civil society to local
populations. The proposed model is intended to guide the main
stakeholders involved in development projects and policies and reduce
human rights violations in development finance. Lessons from the
business and human rights fields serve as useful templates for
advancing new standards in development finance and analyzing the
effectiveness of results without weighing down financial policy
objectives.
The model seeks to address institutional misalignments between the
development finance sector and human rights through a common
conceptual and policy framework for the actors involved, including
both state and non-state actors. In that way, it combines human rights
prerogatives with the traditional economic mandate of IFIs. Moreover,
it suggests a systemic way to fill the governance gap between the
scope of IFIs’ activities and their capacity to manage adverse
consequences, addressing governance gaps in human rights at the
international and domestic levels.
The Protect, Respect and Remedy model comprises three essential
and complementary pillars.262 First, it focuses on human rights
protection at the state level, analyzing it in the context of developing
countries, in conjunction with IFIs’ prerogative of supporting
domestic governance through accountability, clarity, predictability,
and transparency.263 Second, it evaluates how human rights are treated
in IFIs’ policies and projects, especially in light of the World Bank’s
new Environmental and Social Framework.264 Third, it assesses the
remedies available to affected individuals through quasi-judicial and
judicial mechanisms – Internal Accountability Mechanisms and
262. See Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 8, at 4.
263. See id.
264. See id.
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domestic courts, respectively.265 These three pillars combined build a
more solid architecture for governance of IFIs with a forward-looking
view of development finance and human rights.
Human rights constitute the fil rouge that allows tailoring
governance paradigms in development finance to the 2030 agenda for
sustainable development.266 IFIs’ engagement with human rights
corresponds with the recent operationalization of environmental and
social standards in development finance and a deeper accountability
through quasi-judicial and judicial solutions.267 First, the World
Bank’s launch of the Environmental and Social Framework in October
2018 established a new policy strategy to enable the Bank and its
borrowers to better manage environmental and social risks and
improve development outcomes.268 Second, the 2019 U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Jam v. International Finance Corp. redefined
international organizations’ responsibilities before domestic courts.269
Development finance goals of reducing poverty and enhancing
shared prosperity would be better furthered if effective human rights
protections and remedies were available. Giving voice to people who
ultimately bear the effects of IFIs’ policies and programs by providing
them with the tools to seek judicial protection and redress would not
only secure inclusion in development finance but also enhance respect
for human rights. Only in this way will IFIs be able to cope with their
challenge of building a solid commitment to human rights in
borrowing countries.
265. See id.
266. See G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 2, at 1–4 (presenting the 2030 Agenda as a
plan of action for people, planet, and prosperity).
267. See Ending Poverty and Sharing Prosperity, supra note 3, at 35–36
(discussing the World Bank’s engagement in economic growth); Environmental and
Social Framework, supra note 6, at 15–16 (highlighting a plan to achieve
environmental and social outcomes consistent with the Environmental and Social
Standards); Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 771–72.
268. See Environmental and Social Framework, supra note 6, at 15–16
(discussing the borrower’s responsibilities for assessing managing and monitoring
environmental and social risks and impacts).
269. See Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 759.
